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REDUCING INEQUALITY WITH A
RETROSPECTIVE TAX ON CAPITAL
James Kwak*
Inequality in the developed world is high and growing: in the
United States, 1% of the population now owns more than 40% of all
wealth.  In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, economist Thomas
Piketty argues that inequality is only likely to increase: invested capital
tends to grow faster than the economy as a whole, causing wealth to
concentrate in a small number of hands and eventually producing a soci-
ety dominated by inherited fortunes.  The solution he proposes, an an-
nual wealth tax, has been reflexively dismissed even by supporters of his
overall thesis, and presents a number of practical difficulties.  However,
a retrospective capital tax—which imposes a tax on the sale of an asset
based on its (imputed) historical values—can reduce the rate of return
on investments and thereby slow down the growth of wealth inequality.
A retrospective capital tax mitigates or avoids the administrative and
constitutional problems with a simple annual wealth tax and can reduce
the rate of return on capital more effectively than a traditional income
tax.  This Article proposes a revenue-neutral implementation of a retro-
spective capital tax in the United States that would apply to only 5% of
the population and replace most existing taxes on capital, including the
estate tax and the corporate income tax.  Despite conventional wisdom,
there are reasons to believe that such a tax could be politically feasible
even in the United States today.
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INTRODUCTION
Don Draper and Roger Sterling are both handsome, impeccably
dressed, and very, very rich.1  But they came by their money in com-
pletely different ways.  Don is the proverbial self-made man, the bastard
son of a prostitute who climbed to the top of the advertising industry
through pluck, hard work, and an enormous amount of talent.  Roger
inherited both his share of the partnership where they work and his major
account from his father, and his main skill seems to be lavishly entertain-
ing clients.
Don and Roger are business partners and (usually) good friends.
But in the contest between inheritance and merit—here referring to abil-
ity and effort, not moral rectitude—Don’s side seems to be winning.
Over the course of the 1960s, Don grows in importance from a valuable
employee to the dominant partner at the firm, while Roger loses his sta-
tus as chief rainmaker to Pete Campbell and sees his wealth sliced into
pieces by successive divorces.  (A scion of old New York aristocracy
who now must work for a living, a relentless striver driven by raw ambi-
1 Mad Men (AMC television broadcast 2007–2015).
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tion, Pete symbolizes all by himself the decline of inherited privilege and
the rise of earned income.)  In 1960s America—as seen through the lens
of Mad Men—the old hierarchy of birth is giving way to a new order
based on talent and hard work.2  “I always envied that—the way you
were always reaching,” Roger says to Don one evening over drinks.  “I
always envied [that] you didn’t have to,” Don responds.  “In another life-
time I’d have been your chauffeur.”3
Everyone knows we live in an unequal society.  In the United
States, the “1%,” made famous by Occupy Wall Street, take home more
than 20% of all income4 and own more than 40% of all household
wealth.5  How we see these outcomes, however, depends on their under-
lying cause.  Many people look more favorably on inequality resulting
from ability and effort than inequality resulting from inheritance.  In this
respect, the worldview of Mad Men is fundamentally meritocratic—and
optimistic.
If the 1960s belonged to Don, however, the future belongs to
Roger—who, despite his divorces and his expensive lifestyle, never
seems to run out of cash, and probably becomes richer than ever when
the agency is sold to McCann Erickson.6  This is the central argument
that Thomas Piketty makes in Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
Piketty’s empirical research indicates that throughout most of history,
invested wealth has grown faster than the overall economy; he projects
that the same relationship will hold in the future.7  (The 1960s actually
were an exception, thanks to high economic growth, high taxes, and low
interest rates8—a rare opportunity for people like Don Draper to join
Roger Sterling at the pinnacle of American society.)  Inequality9 of
wealth will increase as a logical consequence as the richest families—
who can afford to save most of their investment returns—watch their
fortunes grow faster than the aggregate wealth of society.10  Or, as a
wealthy friend said to me apologetically, “Once you have a lot of money,
2 As if to drive the point home, Roger’s mother leaves most of her assets to zoo animals.
Mad Men: The Doorway (AMC television broadcast Apr. 7, 2013).
3 Mad Men: Time & Life (AMC television broadcast Apr, 26, 2015).
4 Facundo Alvaredo et al., United States, THE WORLD TOP INCOMES DATABASE, http://
topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/#Country:United%20States (last visited Apr. 17,
2015).  Income includes capital gains.
5 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20625, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf.
6 Mad Men: Waterloo (AMC television broadcast, May 25, 2014).
7 See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 20–21 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
8 See id. at 355–56.
9 See id. at 1–35.
10 See id. at 10.
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it’s like you’re in a rocket ship that takes off.  You just can’t help reach-
ing escape velocity.”
How can we prevent the continual growth of inequality and the
eventual domination of society by inherited wealth?  One implication of
Piketty’s analysis is that policies that seek to promote equality of oppor-
tunity—investing in education, for example—are unlikely to stem the
tide.  If the rate of return on invested wealth exceeds the rate of eco-
nomic growth in the long term, high levels of inequality are inescapable.
Piketty recommends a global, annual wealth tax, with higher rates for the
largest fortunes, in order to slow down the rate at which wealth accumu-
lates.11  This proposal, however, has been one of the least well-received
parts of Capital in the Twenty-First Century, roundly criticized as admin-
istratively unworkable, economically misguided, politically impossible,
or unconstitutional (in the United States).12  Many of these criticisms
have some merit.  But this does not mean that we should simply give up.
This Article takes up the challenge of identifying a tax system that
can slow down the process of wealth concentration.  After considering
various alternatives—including an annual wealth tax—I recommend a
retrospective capital tax, which imposes tax liability when cash is re-
ceived from investments while approximating the economic impact of a
wealth tax.  I provide a detailed proposal, including thresholds and tax
rates, to show how this retrospective tax can replace most existing taxes
on capital (the estate tax, the corporate income tax, and most individual
taxes on investment income) while maintaining the current overall tax
burden.13
This Article is part of the response by the legal academy to the is-
sues raised by Piketty’s work and to the problem of rising inequality in
general.  Many legal scholars have written short-form responses to or
book reviews of Capital in the Twenty-First Century.14  There have been
fewer articles focusing on how the law can address the problem of con-
tinuing wealth accumulation highlighted by the book.  Shi-Ling Hsu has
11 Id. at 515–17.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part V.D.
14 See, e.g., David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626
(2014) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)); Sa-
muel Moyn, Thomas Piketty and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 49
(2014); Neil H. Buchanan, Thomas Piketty’s Book Is Masterful and Important, but Ultimately
a Sideshow, JOTWELL (July 8, 2014), http://tax.jotwell.com/thomas-pikettys-book-is-master
ful-and-important-but-ultimately-a-sideshow; Kent D. Schenkel, Trusts and Estates Law and
the Question of Wealth Distribution, JOTWELL (July 8, 2014), http://trustest.jotwell.com/
trusts-and-estates-law-and-the-question-of-wealth-distribution/; Daniel Shaviro, The Return of
Capital, JOTWELL (July 8, 2014), http://tax.jotwell.com/the-return-of-capital/; Michael J.
Zimmer, (Re)Booting the Dismal Science, JOTWELL (July 8, 2014), http://worklaw.jotwell.
com/rebooting-the-dismal-science/.
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described how existing legal institutions contribute to inequality by
favoring investors and increasing their returns on capital.15  Joseph
Bankman and Daniel Shaviro have provided the most in-depth analysis
of the insights that tax theory can add to Piketty’s work.16  This Article
discusses some of the issues raised by Bankman and Shaviro, but pro-
ceeds to offer a specific tax proposal that is informed by those perspec-
tives.  This Article is also, as far as I am aware, the first that applies a
particular system of retrospective taxation—originally conceived by
Alan Auerbach17—to the specific problem of increasing wealth inequal-
ity and that estimates a set of parameters with which that system could
replace most existing taxes on capital.
Part I summarizes why our current economic system is likely to
produce increasing levels of inequality.  Part II evaluates Piketty’s pro-
posed annual wealth tax and identifies its most important practical fail-
ings.  Part III reviews some principles of tax theory that are necessary to
understand how different taxes can affect returns to capital.  Part IV con-
siders and rejects the idea of using income taxes to stem the growth of
inequality.  Part V explains how a retrospective capital tax could work
and proposes an implementation for the United States with details on
thresholds, marginal rates, and taxes that would be replaced.  Part VI
concludes by arguing that, while admittedly unlikely in the short term, a
retrospective capital tax is within the realm of political possibility.
I. THE PROBLEM
Inequality in developed countries is at heights last seen in Old Re-
gime France or Victorian England.  In the United States, the top 10% of
households claim almost half of all national income, with the top 1%
taking home one-fifth—about the same as the bottom 50%.18  These
levels of income concentration have existed only once before in Ameri-
can history, just before the Crash of 1929.19  Wealth inequality is even
more extreme than income inequality.  In the United States, the top 10%
of households own more than three-quarters of all wealth.20  The picture
15 See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Rise and Rise of the One Percent: Considering Legal Causes of
Wealth Inequality, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2043 (2015), http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/
volumes/64/online/hsu.pdf.
16 Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty in America: A Tale of Two Literatures, 68
TAX L. REV. 453 (2015); see also Liam Murphy, Why Does Inequality Matter?: Reflections on
the Political Morality of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 68 TAX L. REV. 613
(2015).
17 See infra Part V.B.
18 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 249 tbl.7.3.
19 See id. at 299–300.
20 Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, at tbl.1. R
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is similar in Europe, where the top 10% claim more than one-third of all
income and hold three-fifths of all wealth.21
More worryingly, Piketty argues, global inequality is only likely to
increase.  On the one hand, the rate of economic growth, abbreviated as
g, should decline from the high levels of recent decades for two reasons.
First, population growth should fall as developing countries transition to
lower birth rates.22  Second, the growth rate of per capita output—the
amount that the average person produces—will probably fall as emerging
economies move through the “catch-up” phase of development and adopt
the technologies used in advanced economies.23  Since economic expan-
sion requires either more people or more output per person, g is likely to
fall below 2% over the course of this century.24
On the other hand, the rate of return on capital—the annual amount
that people earn from investments in real estate, financial instruments,
privately-held businesses, artwork, and other forms of wealth,25 abbrevi-
ated as r—has exceeded 4% per year in every historical era for which
reasonable data exist, including recent decades.26  A variety of factors,
including legal institutions that favor returns on capital,27 seem to ensure
that the pre-tax rate of return on capital will remain around 4% to 5%.28
However, it will be difficult for advanced economies to sustain annual
growth that exceeds 2%.29
In the usual state of affairs, then, r > g.  This inequality has held
throughout most of human history except for the past 100 years, and it is
likely to be true in the near future as economic growth slows.30  The
logical implication is that very rich people will get richer relative to eve-
ryone else: if I have a slice of a pie, and my slice is growing at a faster
rate than the pie as a whole, then my share of the pie must also be grow-
21 PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 248–49 tbls.7.2 & 7.3.
22 See id. at 79.
23 See id. at 93–95.  The only sustained growth rates of per capita output above 2% per
year have been in regions that were rebuilding after World War II or were adopting technolo-
gies that already existed in more advanced economies. See id. at 94 tbl.2.5.  Productivity
growth slows when a country reaches the technology frontier because better technologies must
then be invented rather than imported. See id. at 93.
24 See id. at 356–57.
25 “Wealth” and “capital” are near synonyms.  Wealth denotes the assets that someone
owns, while capital refers to those assets as a source of income. See id. at 48.  The main
substantive difference between the two is personal property that does not generate income;
however, for very rich households, that personal property makes up a small fraction of total
wealth. See id. From the household perspective, business capital such as factories or intellec-
tual property appears as equity in those businesses. See id.
26 See id. at 354.
27 See Hsu, supra note 15.
28 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 361.
29 See id. at 94.
30 See id. at 358.
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ing.  People who own large amounts of capital—enough to save most of
their investment income—will control an increasing share of societal
wealth, while everyone else will be left with a diminishing share.  This
process of divergence is mitigated by various factors, such as the division
of estates among multiple children; but the larger the gap between r and
g, the higher the equilibrium level of inequality.31  This is why, Piketty
warns, we may be returning to a society dominated by inherited wealth,
similar to societies of nineteenth century Europe, in which inequality is
determined primarily by the fortunes of birth rather than the distribution
of talent and effort.32
The remainder of this Article considers various tax policies that
might reduce the gap between r and g and counteract this trend toward
increasing wealth concentration.  First, however, we should ask: What if
Piketty is wrong?  What if the period from 1914 to 1980—in which war,
communist revolution, and high taxes depressed returns to capital, reduc-
ing wealth inequality—is the norm, rather than the periods of high ine-
quality before and since?
There are several answers to this question.  Assuming that few peo-
ple look forward to war or communist revolution, proactive government
action will be necessary to reduce the profitability of investments.  Taxes
on capital, such as those considered here, are precisely the means by
which a “norm” of moderate inequality can be maintained.  As Daron
Acemoglu and James Robinson have argued, supposed general laws of
capitalism, such as r > g, are themselves the product of political and
institutional contexts.33  If r does not exceed g over the next two centu-
ries, that outcome will most likely result from changes in the institutional
context—such as new taxes.  In other words, r may not turn out to be
greater than g, but that will result from policies that reduce r or increase
g.34  In sum, although Piketty and other scholars35 have documented con-
temporary income and wealth inequality in unprecedented detail, they
have largely confirmed something that many people have already sensed;
society is becoming more unequal and ordinary people do not seem bet-
31 See id. at 361–66.
32 See id. at 424–29; see also Eric M. Zolt, Inequality in America: Challenges for Tax
and Spending Policies, 66 TAX L. REV. 641, 645–46 (2013) (arguing that many people are
more willing to tolerate inequalities based on talent, effort, or risk-taking than inequalities
based on birth or opportunity). But see James Kwak, Do Smart, Hard-Working People De-
serve to Make More Money?, BASELINE SCENARIO (Nov. 2, 2009), http://baselinescenario.com/
2009/11/02/smart-hard-working-people/.
33 Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, The Rise and Decline of General Laws of
Capitalism, 29 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 11–12 (2015).
34 The point of Piketty’s proposed wealth tax is precisely to prove himself “wrong”
about his predicted rise in inequality by reducing r.
35 See, e.g., Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, at tbl.1.
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ter off as a result.36  Whatever the underlying mechanism, the trend is
toward greater concentration of wealth—an outcome that many people
find undesirable, regardless of their opinions about r and g.37 In this con-
text, we should ask whether and how tax policy can reduce the risk that
our grandchildren will live in a world that is largely owned by Roger
Sterling’s descendants.
II. AN ANNUAL NET WEALTH TAX
To prevent this outcome, Piketty proposes a global, annual wealth
tax at a rate of 1% of net worth38 between 1 million and 5 million euros,
2% from 5 million to 1 billion euros, and something higher above 1 bil-
lion euros.39  Net worth is calculated as of a specific date (say, December
31), and the tax is due on a later date (say, April 15).  “[W]ithout a global
tax on capital or some similar policy,” Piketty argues, “there is a substan-
tial risk that the top centile’s share of global wealth will continue to grow
indefinitely.”40  The intuition behind this proposal is simple.  An annual
2% tax on net assets should reduce r by 2 percentage points: if the pre-
tax rate of return on capital is about 4%, then the after-tax rate of return
will be about 2%41—only a little higher than the long-term economic
growth rate.
Virtually every response to Capital in the Twenty-First Century
mentions the wealth tax and immediately writes it off as hopelessly un-
realistic.42  Most critics barely bother explaining why a wealth tax “isn’t
going to happen.”43  The most common complaints are the difficulty of
reaching global agreement on any subject,44 the possibility that a national
36 For example, real median household income in the United States in 2013 was below
its 1989 level and only 8.6% above its average level in the 1970s; this indicates an annual
growth rate of only 0.2% per year. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, P60-
249, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 23 tbl.A-1 (2014).
37 See Buchanan, supra note 14 (“[W]ithout Piketty’s book, we would still have more R
than enough evidence that we should be increasing taxes on the rich.”).
38 Assets minus liabilities.
39 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 517.
40 Id. at 519.
41 Assume an asset is worth $100 and pays 4% interest, or $4, per year.  Each year the
holder of the asset must pay $2 in tax, so the after-tax return is only $2, or 2%.  (The exact
impact depends on whether the tax is assessed on the asset’s beginning-of-year value or on its
value including returns during the year.)
42 The author himself calls it “utopian” in its proposed form. See PIKETTY, supra note 7,
at 515. But see S. Douglas Hopkins, Replacing Investment Income Taxes with an Annual
Wealth Tax, 147 TAX NOTES 1305, 1306 (2015) (arguing that a wealth tax could be a viable
response to the issues raised by Piketty).
43 See John Cassidy, Forces of Divergence, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 31, 2014), http://
www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2014/03/31/140331crbo_books_cassidy.
44 See id. (“[T]he nations of the world can’t agree on taxing harmful carbon emissions,
let alone taxing the capital of their richest and most powerful citizens.”).
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wealth tax could cause people and assets to emigrate,45 the difficulty of
administering a tax on something that is not systematically measured to-
day,46 and the political unpopularity of new taxes47—a problem intensi-
fied by the possibility that a wealth tax in the United States could be
unconstitutional.48
Although these problems are often exaggerated, they are serious
enough to raise doubts about the practical viability of an annual wealth
tax.  In this Part of the Article, I divide these issues into three categories:
administration, international coordination, and constitutionality (in the
United States).  I defer the economic effects of a wealth tax (or any tax
on capital) until Part III.D and the political feasibility of raising taxes on
the rich until Part VI.
A. Administration
An annual wealth tax faces some significant administrative chal-
lenges.  One issue is identifying the tax base, since the government cur-
rently does not know who owns what.  A second challenge is accurately
valuing certain types of assets, such as closely-held businesses or unu-
sual real estate holdings.  A third commonly cited problem is liquidity: if
a taxpayer owes tax simply for owning an asset—without receiving any
cash from it—the taxpayer may not be able to pay the tax.
1. Identification
To be truly comprehensive, a wealth tax requires a catalog of all
valuable assets, including Renaissance paintings displayed in the family
castle.  Otherwise, some forms of wealth will escape taxation.  In addi-
tion, people will have an incentive to buy assets that are either excluded
from the tax or more easily hidden from fiscal authorities, distorting their
45 See Peter Coy, An Immodest Proposal: A Global Tax on the Superrich, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-10/thomas-
pikettys-global-tax-on-capital-may-not-be-a-crazy-idea (“Even if Congress did pass a wealth
tax, the IRS would have trouble collecting because the wealthy might transfer title to their
assets abroad.”).
46 See James K. Galbraith, Kapital for the Twenty-First Century?, 61 DISSENT 77, 81
(2014), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/kapital-for-the-twenty-first-century (“[I]n a
world where only a few countries accurately measure high incomes, it would require an en-
tirely new tax base, a worldwide Domesday Book recording an annual measure of everyone’s
personal net worth.”).
47 See Robert M. Solow, Thomas Piketty Is Right, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 22, 2014), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/117429/capital-twenty-first-century-thomas-piketty-reviewed
(“On this side of the Atlantic, there would seem to be no serious prospect of such an outcome.
We are politically unable to preserve even an estate tax with real bite.”).
48 See James Wetzler, Thomas Piketty’s Wealth Tax Proposal Has Huge Problems,
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/374380/thomas-pikettys-
wealth-tax-proposal-has-huge-problems-james-wetzler.
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investment choices.  This is a significant challenge, but its scope is easily
exaggerated.
This problem has already been addressed for a large proportion of
existing wealth: real property, which makes up over 40% of gross house-
hold assets (not deducting liabilities) in the United States.49  In order to
ensure secure legal rights to property, real estate ownership is docu-
mented in a central registry, which can then be used to assign property
tax liabilities.50  The next category, at over 30% of gross wealth, is finan-
cial assets such as bank accounts, securities, mutual funds, and life insur-
ance policies.51  Taxpayers are already obligated to report income from
these assets, and in general, they are held through regulated financial
institutions, which could be required to report asset stocks as well as
income flows to the tax authorities.52  Over 20% of household wealth is
equity in unincorporated businesses (partnerships, LLCs, etc.) or in per-
sonal trusts.53  These entities have their own tax filing requirements, re-
gardless of their ownership structure;54 these requirements could be
extended as necessary to disclose the ultimate equity owners of those
entities.  It is true that, in some cases, the natural person who owns an
asset may be hidden by one or more shell companies.55  If it turns out to
be impossible to identify the true owner, the wealth tax can be levied on
one of the shell companies, which must pay the tax or forfeit the asset.56
Less than 2% of household wealth consists of miscellaneous assets
such as precious metals, jewelry, antiques, musical instruments, or art-
work, for which no systematic records may exist today.57  The govern-
ment could introduce a registry for all such assets with a value above
some threshold.  Items on the registry would be subject to a wealth tax.
An individual could decline to register an asset, but if the asset were ever
sold, the proceeds would be subject to a retrospective tax based on a
49 See Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Ris-
ing Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze—an Update to 2007, at 47 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard
College, Working Paper No. 589, 2010), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_589.pdf.
50 If the legal owner of the property is a company that does not currently disclose its
owners, either the wealth tax could be levied on that company, or the company could be
required to disclose its owners.
51 See Wolff, supra note 49, at 47. R
52 I defer international reporting issues until the following section.
53 See Wolff, supra note 49, at 47. R
54 For example, even though partnerships do not pay taxes directly—their income is
“passed through” to the partners’ individual tax returns—they still must file tax returns. See
Partnership, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/partnership (last visited
Apr. 5, 2015).
55 See, e.g., Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Hidden Wealth Flows to Elite New York
Condos, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/nyregion/stream-of-
foreign-wealth-flows-to-time-warner-condos.html.
56 For a progressive wealth tax, the tax should be levied on intermediate entities at the
highest marginal rate.
57 See Wolff, supra note 49, at 47. R
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punitive calculation.58  This penalty should induce most people to regis-
ter assets that they might sell in the future.
2. Valuation
Even if the identification problem can be solved, however, there is
still a valuation problem.  This is a significant issue, although its impor-
tance varies across different asset classes.  David Shakow and Reed
Shuldiner have estimated that 66% of the assets that would probably be
subject to a wealth tax are easy to value, including real estate and most
financial instruments, while less than 8% are difficult to value, primarily
equity in some noncorporate businesses.59  Real property is already sub-
ject to annual valuations for property tax purposes.  Although these valu-
ations are imperfect,60 we are willing to accept them despite their
enormous importance to local government finances.61  Publicly-traded
stocks, mutual fund shares, exchange-traded fund shares, and many fixed
income securities have daily market prices that could easily be used for a
wealth tax.
Other types of financial assets present potential valuation chal-
lenges, however (despite being included in Shakow and Shuldiner’s
“easy” category).62  Less liquid securities require periodic valuation by
financial institutions that hold them on their balance sheets.  However,
these valuations can be highly subjective, especially for “Level 3” assets
for which value is calculated from inputs that cannot be observed in the
market.63  More esoteric investment vehicles such as hedge funds and
private equity funds are valued quarterly or monthly for reporting to in-
58 For example, the tax could assume that the taxpayer had held the asset for a long time
and that, throughout that period, it had been worth its final sale price.  Sales of miscellaneous
assets are already subject to capital gains tax, so any incentive to hide the sale already exists
today.
59 See David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV.
499, 529 (2000). But see James R. Repetti, Commentary, It’s All About Valuation, 53 TAX L.
REV. 607, 611–12 (2000).
60 See Repetti, supra note 59, at 611. R
61 Property taxes average between 0.5% and 1% of gross real estate value.  Benjamin H.
Harris & Brian David Moore, Residential Property Taxes in the United States, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=412959.  This
is the same order of magnitude as Piketty’s proposed wealth tax.  Because property taxes are
levied on gross real estate value, their dollar impact is comparable to that of a wealth tax with
a higher tax rate.
62 See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 59, at 529.
63 See Mark Gongloff, A FAS 157 Primer, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2007), http://
blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2007/11/15/a-fas-157-primer/.  Concerns that financial institutions
were overvaluing “toxic assets” to hide losses helped fuel the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
See Marc Jarsulic, The Origins of the U.S. Financial Crisis of 2007: How a House-Price
Bubble, a Credit Bubble, and Regulatory Failure Caused the Greatest Economic Disaster
Since the Great Depression, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES 21, 33–35 (Gerald A. Epstein & Martin H. Wolfson eds., 2013).
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vestors and for tax purposes.  Still, the Bernie Madoff and other scandals
indicate that such valuations may not always be trustworthy.64  The valu-
ation problem is most significant for privately-held businesses, since
their value for accounting and income tax purposes may vary signifi-
cantly from fair market value, and for miscellaneous assets such as art-
work.  There are possible solutions, but they are not perfect.  For
example, all nonpublic businesses with book value above some threshold
could be required to undergo a periodic appraisal.65  These valuations
could easily be skewed, however, especially if they are paid for by the
firm being valued.
For these reasons, it may not be feasible to administer a wealth tax
that relies on current asset values.  The process of valuing assets without
market prices itself is costly.  For some asset classes, such as real estate,
a periodic appraisal, incremented according to an index in intervening
years, might be sufficient.  However, this would not be appropriate for
privately-held businesses, which are among the most difficult assets to
value.  Taxpayers would attach extreme importance to valuations under
an annual wealth tax, and would thus have greater incentive to engage in
tax avoidance schemes, litigate over appraised values, or shift wealth into
asset classes that are harder to value.  Subjective valuations of illiquid
securities could become even more subjective.  Taxpayers could shift as-
sets into complex ownership structures that qualify for valuation dis-
counts and require careful examination by appraisers and, ultimately,
courts.66  Local property taxes, capital gains taxes, and estate taxes al-
ready create an incentive to contest valuations, but an annual wealth tax
would significantly increase the stakes, resulting in a volume of litigation
that would increase overall transaction costs67 and potentially create a
situation in which a person’s taxes depend on the ability to hire good
lawyers.  Finally, the opportunity to obtain favorable valuations would
give taxpayers an additional reason to hold illiquid assets, distorting their
investment decisions.
3. Liquidity
An annual wealth tax may require taxpayers to pay taxes with cash
that they do not have on hand, but this is unlikely to be a major problem.
Most wealth is held in real estate and financial instruments.  Many finan-
64 See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward, Across Borders,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20madoff.html.
65 Many private corporations already obtain “409A valuations,” which determine a fair
market value for each share of stock.  These valuations enable corporations to demonstrate that
the stock they offer in option plans or restricted stock plans is priced at market value, as
required by the IRS.
66 See Repetti, supra note 59, at 612–14.
67 See id. at 610.
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cial assets can be liquidated easily,68 and others can be sold at a modest
discount or with timing constraints.69  Taxpayers can often borrow
against the value of their financial assets; for example, participants in
employer-sponsored retirement plans can borrow from their accounts.
Asset management firms are happy to lend money to their wealthy cli-
ents.  There is already an enormous industry devoted to real estate
lending.
The liquidity problem is most likely to arise in a few specific con-
texts.  One is if a taxpayer primarily owns real estate but is unable to
borrow against that property, perhaps because of poor credit.  Most of
these situations can be avoided as long as the annual wealth tax has a
significant exemption amount, such as $1 million; most people above
this threshold do not have their wealth tied up in real estate and have
considerable borrowing capacity.  Another possibility is the rare case of a
taxpayer whose wealth is overwhelmingly tied up in a single nonpublic
business and who is unable to borrow against the value of that busi-
ness.70  Even here, administrative solutions are possible.  For example,
the government could lend the taxpayer the money to pay taxes in ex-
change for a security interest in the illiquid asset.
In summary, the identification and liquidity challenges facing an
annual net wealth tax can probably be solved.  However, accurately valu-
ing the assets in the wealth tax base would at best be expensive and
complicated, and at worst give rise to increased tax avoidance, litigation,
and outright fraud.
B. International Coordination
There is no governmental body capable of imposing a global wealth
tax, and it is unlikely that the world’s major economies could agree on a
coordinated tax policy in the near future.  Practically speaking, the most
68 For example, shares in open-ended mutual funds can be redeemed at net asset value;
exchange-traded securities and shares in exchange-traded funds can be sold quickly at fair
market prices.
69 Less liquid securities (e.g., many fixed income securities) can be sold to dealers at
modest bid-ask spreads; hedge funds usually offer liquidity with some constraints; and even
relatively illiquid interests, such as participations in private equity funds, can be traded in
secondary markets.
70 The estate tax should cause much greater liquidity issues for family-owned businesses
than an annual wealth tax because the estate tax is levied at much higher rates.  Yet, according
to the Congressional Budget Office, if the estate tax exclusion had been $3.5 million and the
tax rate had been 48%, at most 41 estates filing estate tax returns in 2000 would have qualified
for the family-owned business interest deduction, and these estates would have had insufficient
liquid assets to pay their estate taxes. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL
ESTATE TAX ON FARMS AND SMALL BUSINESSES 13–15 (2005), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/de
fault/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/65xx/doc6512/07-06-estatetax.pdf.  In fact, in 2015, the exclusion is
$5.43 million and the top tax rate is 40%, so the number of estates with this problem is even
smaller.
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that could be envisioned is a wealth tax in a single country such as the
United States or a federation such as the European Union.71  Accord-
ingly, the wealth targeted by the tax might escape to another jurisdiction.
In this section, I consider the problems that the United States would en-
counter in enforcing a wealth tax, which any other large jurisdiction
would share.
In principle, the United States can tax all wealth held by its re-
sidents, regardless of where their assets are held.  This presents two prac-
tical difficulties.  First, even if residents are legally obligated to report all
of their assets, they could hide assets in foreign countries where they
would be difficult for tax authorities to find.  Second, at some level of
wealth taxation, very rich people might escape the tax by changing their
country of residence.
Analogous problems already affect existing tax systems.  In theory,
the United States currently taxes all its residents’ income, regardless of
where it is earned.72  Still, some capital income currently evades taxation
at the levels mandated by U.S. law.  Certain categories of income are
excluded from the ordinary rules, such as capital gains on U.S. assets
earned by some foreign investors (which motivates U.S. residents to pose
as foreign investors).73  Businesses often succeed in attributing income to
tax haven countries without ever incurring the taxes they should pay
under the U.S. system.74  In addition, individuals can hide income-pro-
ducing assets in jurisdictions that do not report income to U.S.
authorities.
These challenges have potential, but imperfect, solutions.  Interna-
tional tax evasion could be solved through better information-sharing,
but some jurisdictions have a vested interest in preserving their reputa-
tion for secrecy.  Countries that are unwilling to participate in informa-
tion-sharing agreements could be designated as tax havens, and source
countries (those where capital income is generated) could impose high
withholding rates on income sent to entities in tax havens.75  Unfortu-
nately, such solutions require a degree of international coordination that
has not yet been achieved.  The United States can take some steps unilat-
71 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 527–30 (suggesting a European wealth tax as a possible
step toward a global wealth tax).
72 See Julie A. Roin, Can Income from Capital Be Taxed? An International Perspective,
in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 211, 212 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007).  Since other countries
generally tax income earned within their borders, the United States allows a tax credit for
income taxes paid to other countries. See id. The same approach could be adopted for a
wealth tax: if a U.S. resident pays a wealth tax to a foreign country for assets held in that
country, those payments could be credited against wealth taxes due to the United States.
73 See id. at 213–14.
74 See id. at 216–21.
75 See id. at 222–24.  Most income-producing assets held in most tax havens (e.g., Cay-
man Islands, Bermuda) do not generate their income within those jurisdictions.
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erally.  For example, the Department of Justice’s campaign against Swiss
banks resulted in a settlement with UBS, guilty pleas by Wegelin and
Credit Suisse, billions of dollars in penalties, and disclosure of thousands
of accounts owned by American taxpayers.76  The Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act77 requires foreign financial institutions to disclose infor-
mation about American-owned accounts to the Internal Revenue Service,
under threat of penalties assessed on those institutions’ assets in the
United States.  Still, smaller institutions without direct exposure to the
U.S. financial system could refuse to cooperate.  These unilateral mea-
sures make it significantly more difficult and risky to evade U.S. taxes,
but they are not a complete solution.
The key question here is whether an annual wealth tax would in-
crease or decrease the potential for evasion.  In principle, it should be no
more difficult to require foreign financial institutions to report asset hold-
ings than to require them to disclose income flows.  One category of tax
avoidance—exploiting the varying tax treatment of different types of in-
come—would be eliminated by a wealth tax, which does not distinguish
among income flows.  An annual wealth tax, however, could signifi-
cantly expand both the types of assets that must be reported and the types
of institutions that must do the reporting.  In addition, the valuation re-
quirement would create the opportunity for taxpayers to place assets in
jurisdictions where valuation practices differ or where it would be diffi-
cult for the IRS to investigate a case.  On the whole, existing taxes on
capital income already face significant international coordination
problems, but an annual wealth tax could exacerbate the situation.
Finally, taxpayers could escape a U.S. wealth tax by moving to an-
other country and, if necessary, renouncing their U.S. citizenship.  But
this is a risk with any tax.  Rationally speaking, a taxpayer’s decision to
emigrate or not should be based on the total amount of expected taxes,
not the choice of tax base.  An annual wealth tax aimed primarily at large
fortunes could be coupled with reductions in other taxes to maintain the
same overall tax level.78  In that case, there is no a priori reason to think
that a wealth tax would cause more people to emigrate than the current
76 Peter Lattman, Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty to Tax Law Violations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3,
2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/swiss-bank-pleads-guilty-to-tax-law-viola-
tions/; Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty in Felony Case,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/credit-suisse-set-to-
plead-guilty-in-tax-evasion-case/; Julia Werdigier, Tax Haven Closes for Wealthy Americans,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/tax-haven-closes-for-
wealthy-americans/.
77 See Pub. L. No. 111-147, 24 Stat. 97 (2010).
78 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 518 (proposing using the wealth tax to raise a modest
amount of revenue, although this is not a crucial part of the proposal); see also Paul L. Caron,
Thomas Piketty and Inequality: Legal Causes and Tax Solutions, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2073,
2083 (2015), http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/64/online/hsu.pdf (proposing, al-
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system.  Instead, shifting to a wealth tax would give different types of
people greater or lesser incentives to relocate.  A system with higher
taxes on accumulated wealth would cause more people who live off of
capital income to emigrate, while encouraging more people who live off
their labor not to emigrate.79  Given the choice, we should prefer to let
the people who already amassed (or inherited) their fortunes depart.
High net worth reflects past events and is a poor proxy for future produc-
tivity.  In addition, the very wealthy will most likely continue to invest
their assets globally regardless of where they live, so the departure of a
rich American should not reduce the capital available for investment in
the United States.
C. Constitutionality
An annual wealth tax might violate two clauses of the U.S. Consti-
tution: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers . . . .”80  “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax
shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken.”81  The argument is that a wealth tax is a
“direct tax” and that, therefore, the amount raised from each state must
be proportional to its population.  This implies that the average tax rate
for each state must be inversely proportional to its average household
wealth: the poorer the state, the higher the tax rate.  Besides being both
morally and politically questionable, this outcome would undermine the
purpose of the wealth tax, since the richest taxpayers could reduce their
taxes by moving to the richest states.
It is not certain that a wealth tax is unconstitutional (unless appor-
tioned) because no one really knows what a “direct tax” is.  In 1895, in
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., the Supreme Court interpreted
that phrase to include taxes on real estate and personal property.82  Even
accepting that decision, there are various ways to distinguish a wealth
tax.  It can be interpreted as a tax on imputed income83 or as an income
tax on the risk-free return and on inframarginal returns (for theoretical
ternatively, that increased taxes on the wealthy could be aimed at both reducing inequality and
reducing budget deficits).
79 People with high wealth may be more likely to emigrate than people who earn high
incomes, but this should not be assumed.  The people with the highest annual compensation
tend to be investment fund managers, bankers, and CEOs of large corporations, many of whom
could find employment anywhere in the world.
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
82 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895).
83 An owner-occupied home, for example, generates imputed income for its owner who
lives in it rent-free; taxing the house could be framed as taxing this imputed income.
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reasons discussed in Part III.B).84  A net wealth tax can also be distin-
guished by the fact that it takes liabilities into account.85  These argu-
ments are not terribly convincing, however; the availability of alternative
framings does not oblige courts to accept them,86 and an annual wealth
tax certainly looks a lot like a tax on real estate and personal property.  A
Supreme Court following Pollock very well might strike it down.
Alternatively, one can argue that the “direct tax” language of Pol-
lock was simply wrong and part of a discredited period of judicial history
that the Supreme Court has never bothered to explicitly overrule.87
However, the Court appeared to endorse Pollock’s broad definition of
direct taxes in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
in 2012,88 making it unlikely that Pollock will be overruled anytime
soon.89  An annual wealth tax would face a constitutional challenge with
a significant likelihood of success.90  Barring a constitutional amendment
specifically allowing a wealth tax, constitutional uncertainty is a strong
argument against attempting to implement such a tax in the United
States.91
84 See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV.
423, 441 (2000).
85 A homeowner with a mortgage exceeding the house’s value would owe nothing for
the house, so the tax does not apply strictly to the ownership of property.
86 See John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Proposal for a Constitutionally
Apportioned Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 509 (2014).
87 Bruce Ackerman claims that: the “direct tax” provisions of the Constitution were part
of the three-fifths compromise (counting each slave as three-fifths of a free person for repre-
sentation purposes) that was reversed by the Fourteenth Amendment; that Pollock was repudi-
ated by the Sixteenth Amendment; and that Pollock was superseded by the New Deal decisions
expanding the federal government’s powers of taxation. See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and
the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31, 39, 47 (1999); see also id. at 51 (concluding that
the Supreme Court would read the direct tax provisions of the Constitution narrowly and allow
a tax on net wealth); BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 123
(1999); Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the
Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998).
88 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
89 See Plecnik, supra note 86, at 507.  The reference to Pollock is approving, but histori- R
cal (“In 1895, we expanded our interpretation . . . .”), so it does not amount to an explicit
reaffirmation. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598.
90 Joseph Dodge concludes that a wealth tax that reaches real estate and tangible property
would be unconstitutional, even under a relatively restrictive interpretation of the phrase “di-
rect tax.”  Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 933–34 (2009).
91 John Plecnik has proposed a “constitutionally apportioned wealth tax”: the federal
government would collect a uniform percentage of net wealth from all taxpayers and then
return enough of the proceeds to states to make the net amount collected from each state
consistent with apportionment.  If states pass their wealth tax rebates through to taxpayers, the
effective tax rate will be higher in poorer states than in richer states.  However, the federal
government could provide incentives for states to hold onto their rebates. See Plecnik, supra
note 86, at 511–15.  This approach might work, but on the other hand it might not.  From the R
standpoint of state politics, not refunding the wealth tax rebates to households is equivalent to
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D. Summary
Piketty’s proposed annual net wealth tax is more practical than most
reviewers assume, but faces some serious challenges.  Although the iden-
tification problem could be addressed and the liquidity problem is largely
illusory, the annual valuation requirement creates major administrative
complications and the corresponding potential for avoidance and contes-
tation.  An annual wealth tax complicates the existing problem of inter-
national coordination.  Finally, in the United States, such a tax could
very well be unconstitutional.92  For these reasons, we should consider
alternative tax systems that could reduce the gap between r and g.  This
will first require a brief detour through tax theory.
III. TAX THEORY INTERLUDE
As other scholars have noted, Piketty’s policy recommendations do
not take under consideration some of the tax theory literature developed
in recent decades, in particular concerning the differences between alter-
native tax bases such as consumption, income, or wealth.93  This Part
summarizes some key principles that will be useful in evaluating how
different tax systems might affect the return on investments and the
growth of inequality.
A. Consumption and Income Taxes
The taxation of capital income—income from investments—is a
key topic in tax theory and policy particularly because of debates over
consumption and income taxes.  An ideal income tax is assessed on in-
come from all sources, including both labor income and capital income.
Under a consumption tax, by contrast, the tax base is current consump-
tion—the amount spent purchasing goods and services—which equals
income (from all sources) minus net savings.  If a taxpayer has $100 in
labor income but saves $20, then the other $80 is spent on consumption;
if labor income is $100 but the taxpayer draws down savings by $20,
then $120 is spent on consumption.94  Under an income tax, the $100 in
imposing a new state tax.  One can easily imagine state politicians returning the cash to tax-
payers and forgoing any incentives provided by the federal government.
92 But see Hopkins, supra note 42, at 1311 (“If a constitutional prohibition can be shown
to be economically or morally unjustifiable, then it doesn’t deserve our blind obeisance.”).
93 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 14; Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 16, at 455–56. R
Piketty has made several contributions to the literature on the optimal taxation of labor income
and discusses some of his findings in Capital in the Twenty-First Century. See PIKETTY, supra
note 7, at 509–12.
94 See Eric Toder & Kim Rueben, Should We Eliminate Taxation of Capital Income?, in
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 89, 93 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007).  This is true whether the
tax is implemented as an income tax with a deduction for net savings or as a tax collected at
the point of consumption.
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labor income is taxed when earned, regardless of savings; but any money
saved is exempt from additional taxes in the future, and only earnings on
that savings (interest, dividends, etc.) are taxed.95  If people consume all
of their labor income and never accumulate any savings to invest, then a
consumption tax and an income tax are identical.  It follows that the dif-
ference between the two lies in how they treat savings and the return on
investments.96
An income tax affects returns from savings while a consumption tax
does not.  Assume that a taxpayer has $100 in labor income but only
needs to consume $40 worth of goods and services and invests any sur-
plus in a risk-free, one-year government bond paying 10% interest.
Under a 50% consumption tax, in year 1, $40 of consumption uses up
$80 of income,97 leaving $20 to invest in the bond; in year 2, the bond is
redeemed for $22,98 which can pay for $11 of consumption.99  Under a
50% income tax, in year 1, the taxpayer pays $50 in tax on $100 in
income,100 spends $40 on consumption, and invests $10 in the bond; in
year 2, the bond is redeemed for $11,101 but $0.50 in tax must be paid on
$1 of interest income,102 leaving $10.50 to spend on consumption.  Com-
pared to the consumption tax, the income tax reduces the taxpayer’s year
2 consumption by $0.50, which is the tax rate of 50% times the invest-
ment income of $1.  The key difference between the consumption and
the income tax is that only the latter affects income from capital.
As a corollary, only an income tax affects an investor’s rate of re-
turn on capital.  In the above example, under the income tax, the taxpayer
invests $10, earns a 10% pre-tax return, but pays half of those returns to
the government, leaving a 5% after-tax return.  Under the consumption
tax, the taxpayer invests $20, but only forgoes $10 of consumption in
95 See id.
96 From the household perspective, “savings,” “investments,” and “capital” are three
ways of looking at the same thing.  When money is saved, it must go into some asset—a bank
account, stocks, real estate, etc.  Those assets are all investments that earn returns (which may
be negative).  Those investments collectively constitute the household’s capital. See Bankman
& Shaviro, supra note 16, at 456–58. R
97 Of the $80, 50% goes to the consumption tax and 50% purchases actual goods and
services.  The 50% is a tax-inclusive rate, which is equivalent to a 100% tax-exclusive rate.  I
use the tax-inclusive rate for two reasons: first, for consistency with the income tax, which is
always quoted as a tax-inclusive rate; second, because the consumption tax could be imple-
mented as a (tax-inclusive) tax on labor income with a deduction for net savings.
98 $20 + 10% interest = $22.
99 The consumption tax is $22 x 50% = $11.  A simple labor tax at 50% produces the
same outcome.  In year 1, the taxpayer pays $50 in tax on $100 of income, spends $40 on
consumption, and invests $10 in the bond; in year 2, the taxpayer receives $11 for consump-
tion, which is not taxed because it does not represent labor income.
100 $100 x 50% = $50 in income tax.
101 $10 + 10% interest = $11.
102 $1 x 50% = $0.50.
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year 1;103 the next year, the taxpayer earns a 10% pre-tax return on the
$20, redeems the bond for $22, and consumes $11 worth of goods and
services (after the 50% consumption tax).  In effect, the taxpayer earns a
10% after-tax return on the $10 in consumption given up in year 1.
Compared to an income tax, this is akin to the government putting up
half the money to buy the bond in year 1 ($10 of the $20 investment) and
claiming half the proceeds in year 2 ($11 of the $22 in principal and
interest); thus, there is no effect on the taxpayer’s rate of return.104  As a
result, an income tax penalizes savings by making consumption in the
future more expensive than consumption today,105 while a consumption
tax does not affect the incentive to save.106  By distorting people’s
choices between spending and saving, an income tax reduces economic
welfare, at least under certain assumptions.107  This is the primary reason
why many scholars argue that a consumption tax is preferable to an in-
come tax108—an issue I return to in section D, below.
B. Taxing Returns to Capital
The relationship between consumption and income taxes is not sim-
ply that the latter taxes the return on capital while the former does not.
More specifically, capital income can be divided into three categories:
the risk-free return (e.g., on U.S. Treasury bills); returns earned by taking
risk (e.g., on a global stock index fund); and “inframarginal” returns
from investments that are unusually attractive because of factors such as
market power, rare skills, or protected intellectual property109 (e.g., on
the stock that David Choe received for painting Facebook’s offices in
2005).110
103 If the taxpayer had saved nothing, consumption could only have increased from $40 to
$50 worth of goods and services.
104 See Noe¨l B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax
Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 24–25 (1996).
105 See Toder & Rueben, supra note 94, at 103. R
106 Under a consumption tax, any dollar I save is likely to turn into more than a dollar in
the future; however, discounted back to the present, the consumption I can buy with those
expected future dollars equals the value of the consumption I am forgoing today. See id.
107 See George R. Zodrow, Should Capital Income Be Subject to Consumption-Based
Taxation?, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 49, 54–58 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007).
108 See Toder & Rueben, supra note 94, at 100–04. R
109 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on Capital, in TAXING CAPITAL
INCOME 165, 168 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007); see also Cunningham, supra note 104, at R
23.
110 Nick Bilton, Facebook Graffiti Artist Could Be Worth $500 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
7, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/facebook-graffiti-artist-could-be-worth-
500-million/.  I chose Choe’s Facebook stock rather than Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook stock
because the returns on the latter were arguably partly returns on Zuckerberg’s labor, not his
capital investment.  Choe, by contrast, took Facebook stock instead of cash for his work and
did not contribute to Facebook’s growth thereafter.
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In theory, an ideal income tax (which covers all real increases in
wealth, whether or not they are realized, and allows full deductions for
losses) taxes risk-free returns but does not tax returns earned by taking
risk.111  This result follows from the fact that each investor has control
over the allocation between risk-free and risky assets.  An income tax
reduces both gains and losses, lowering overall risk, because the govern-
ment claims a share of the returns (positive or negative).  However, an
investor can respond to the tax by increasing the allocation to risky in-
vestments to restore her preferred risk level.  This enables the investor to
reproduce the same outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of
taxes, except that in each state of the world the rate of return will be
reduced by the tax rate times the risk-free rate of return.112  If the risk-
free rate is 2% and the tax rate is 50%, the overall rate of return will be
only 1 percentage point lower than in a world without taxes, at least for
savvy investors.  This also implies that an income tax can never reduce
the rate of return on capital by more than the risk-free rate: if the risk-
free rate is 2%, a 99% income tax will only reduce r by 1.98%.  This
constraint severely limits the impact of a capital income tax, at least in
theory.113
So far, tax theory holds that an income tax affects the risk-free re-
turn but not the return from bearing risk, while a consumption tax affects
neither.  The final category of capital income is returns from in-
framarginal investments—”inframarginal” because any rational investor
would exhaust them before allocating money to “marginal” invest-
ments.114  A consumption tax does not directly reduce the rate of return
111 See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 29. R
112 For example, assume that, in the absence of taxes, a taxpayer would invest $50 in a
risk-free bond yielding a 2% return and $50 in a risky asset yielding a 8% or 0% return with
equal probabilities.  The bond will return $1 and the risky asset will yield $4 or $0, for a total
return of either $5 or $1; since these are equally likely, the expected return is $3, or 3%.  If the
income tax rate is 50% and the taxpayer does not adjust investments, the total pre-tax return
will still be $5 or $1, so the after-tax return will be $2.50 or $0.50, for an expected return of
$1.50, or 1.5%.  However, the investor can instead invest all $100 in the risky asset, which will
yield $8 or $0 before taxes and $4 or $0 after taxes—exactly $1 less, in both scenarios, than in
the world without taxes.  The expected return will then be $2, or 2%.  Relative to the world
without taxes, the returns have fallen by the tax rate (50%) times the risk-free rate of return
(2%), or 1 percentage point. See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 30–34 (demonstrating gen- R
eral algebraic solution).  In retrospect, the tax will appear to have claimed a share of the re-
turns from bearing risk; in the example above, the taxpayer invests all of the money in a risky
asset with a 4% pre-tax expected return, resulting in a 2% after-tax expected return.  Relative
to the world without taxes, however, the expected return has only fallen by one percentage
point.
113 The constraint also implies that income taxes may not have played the major role in
tempering inequality in the twentieth century that Piketty ascribes to them. See PIKETTY,
supra note 7, at 373.
114 For example, if you are the only person who knows that there is oil under a plot of
farmland and thus can buy it for much less than it is worth, you would buy all of that land
before investing in any other assets.
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on inframarginal investments.  As above, the government’s share of the
investment proceeds exactly balances its share of the initial investment.
However, the government’s ability to claim a share of these investments
reduces the amount the taxpayer can invest in them, lowering the overall
rate of return.115  An income tax has a similar impact on inframarginal
investments.  Because access to these opportunities is limited, a taxpayer
cannot arbitrarily increase the allocation to them in response to the tax,
and therefore cannot make the portfolio adjustment required to minimize
its effect.116  Hence, an income tax also reduces the rate of return on
inframarginal investments.117
C. Income and Wealth Taxes
Recall that an income tax affects the risk-free rate of return but not
the return from bearing risk, at least for investors who make appropriate
portfolio adjustments.  This implies that a tax on investment income dur-
ing a year has essentially the same impact as a wealth tax assessed on the
taxpayer’s capital at the beginning of the year (leaving aside in-
framarginal investments for the moment).  For any risk-free rate of return
rF, an income tax at rate t will reduce the taxpayer’s overall rate of return
by rFt, so the effective amount of the tax is rFtW, where W is the amount
of wealth the taxpayer had at the beginning of the year.  The same result
can be achieved with a wealth tax at rate rFt.118  Using the numbers
above, if the risk-free rate is 2%, a 50% income tax will have the same
effect as a 1% wealth tax: either way, each investor’s rate of return will
be 1 percentage point lower than in a world without taxes.
Like an income tax, a wealth tax does not affect the return to risk in
the specific sense that its impact on a taxpayer, relative to a world with-
out taxes, is the same whether that taxpayer’s investments do well or
poorly.  A wealth tax is assessed as a percentage of net assets at a point
in time—say, 1%.  A tax assessed on December 31, 2014 (regardless of
when it is due) obviously does not depend on investment returns in 2015.
We can think of that tax as lowering 2015 returns by 1 percentage point,
regardless of actual outcomes.119  (Similar to an income tax, a wealth tax
can affect inframarginal returns.  If an investor enjoys exceptional re-
115 See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 27. R
116 See Schenk, supra note 84, at 440.
117 See id.  A fourth category of returns is compensation for expected inflation.  In theory,
neither an ideal consumption tax nor an ideal income tax burdens the inflation premium; in
practice, the failure to index the income tax base means that the real-world income tax does
burden the inflation premium. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Pro-
gressive Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91, 101 (2004).
118 See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 35. R
119 See Schenk, supra note 84, at 438–40.  The wealth tax assessed on December 31, 2015 R
does depend on 2015 returns: for every additional dollar of 2015 returns, the taxpayer will pay
an additional $0.01 in 2015 wealth taxes.  However, this is essentially a 1% tax on 2015 capital
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turns from an inframarginal investment, those returns will appear in the
tax base on the next assessment date; by definition, a taxpayer cannot
arbitrarily increase the allocation to the inframarginal investment in order
to minimize the impact of the tax.)120  Unlike a capital income tax, how-
ever, the impact of a wealth tax is not limited by the amount of the risk-
free rate.  Even if the risk-free rate is 2%, for example, a wealth tax could
be imposed at a rate of 3% or higher.121  For this reason, a wealth tax can
be targeted to reduce r by any reasonable number of percentage
points.122
In summary, a wealth tax and an income tax place largely the same
burden on capital; both differ from a consumption tax in their ability to
affect the risk-free return.123  Taxpayers would hold different investment
portfolios under the wealth and income taxes: they would allocate more
capital to risky assets under an income tax than under a wealth tax, be-
cause the income tax demands much larger portfolio adjustments.  Tak-
ing government fiscal policy into account (since government revenues
depend on taxpayers’ investment choices), however, the market-wide al-
location between risk-free and risky assets remains the same.124  In the-
ory, then, a wealth tax has the same economic effects as a tax on capital
income.  Perhaps the most important difference is that an income tax
cannot reduce r by more than the risk-free rate, while a wealth tax has no
such limitation.
D. Why Tax Capital Income at All?
As discussed in section A, a consumption tax does not affect the
choice between saving and spending, while an income tax penalizes sav-
ing.  This is the basis for the near-consensus among academics that, at
income, and therefore the taxpayer can minimize the impact of this tax by increasing the
allocation to risky assets, just as with any income tax.
120 If a taxpayer earns extraordinary returns during a tax year, he or she is not captured by
the wealth tax until the end of the year, leaving open the possibility that the taxpayer could
consume those returns before they are subject to tax. See id. at 443.  For the purposes of this
paper, though, this is a small difference: if people with access to superior investments choose
to immediately consume their excess returns, then those returns will not contribute to the
buildup of large fortunes and the growth of wealth inequality.
121 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.  The portfolio adjustments described by
Schenk are much too small to significantly reduce the net impact of the wealth tax.  In a model
with one risk-free asset and one risky asset, the appropriate adjustment is to increase the allo-
cation to the risky asset by a factor of 1 / (1 – t) relative to the no-tax world, where t is the tax
rate.  Cunningham, supra note 104, at 31.  For a 3% wealth tax, this would only increase the R
allocation to the risky asset by about 3%, which would have a small impact on the pre-tax rate
of return.
122 See Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 16, at 487. R
123 See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 43; see also Kleinbard, supra note 109, at 167 R
(“A well-designed income tax should be like a wealth tax . . . .”).
124 See Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47
NAT’L TAX J. 789, 792–93 (1994).
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least in theory, a consumption tax is preferable to an income tax.125  In
this respect, a wealth tax is no better than an income tax, since both
reduce the return on savings.  Higher taxes on capital in either form
should reduce savings, lowering overall economic welfare.126  This im-
plies that adding a new wealth tax on top of existing taxes, as suggested
by Piketty, would be economically harmful.  In addition, consumption
may be easier to measure than income, simplifying administration and
reducing opportunities for tax avoidance.127  So perhaps, if our goal is to
reduce inequality, we should consider a progressive consumption tax
rather than a tax on capital.
There is considerable debate about whether taxes on capital actually
reduce economic welfare in the real world.  Even the theoretical benefits
of a consumption tax over an income tax are highly sensitive to modeling
assumptions.128  In addition, there are multiple theoretical arguments in
favor of taxes on capital.129  For example, if people with higher earning
ability are more likely to save than people with lower earning ability,
then taxing savings better links the tax burden to ability to pay.130  Mov-
ing beyond theory, there is little empirical evidence that taxes on savings
and investment actually result in lower savings.131  While tax preferences
for investments may encourage lower- and middle-income families to
save more, this does not seem to be the case for the very rich.132  There-
fore, it is unlikely that taxes on capital income have the pernicious effect
on savings predicted by theoretical models.  In addition, real-world
households engage in various forms of tax avoidance behavior; since tax
bases motivate different types of gaming, it makes sense to levy different
types of taxes rather than relying entirely on consumption or labor
income.133
125 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Con-
sumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2006) (“[B]ased on
current understanding, ideal consumption taxes are superior to ideal income taxes.”); Daniel
Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745, 747 (2007).
126 See Zodrow, supra note 107, at 53–64. R
127 See id. at 50.
128 See id. at 53–64.
129 Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Re-
search to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 165, 177–83 (2011).
130 See id. at 180–81.
131 See Toder & Rueben, supra note 94, at 135 (“[S]tatistical studies find little evidence R
of a positive relationship between saving and the after-tax return.”); see also Emmanuel Saez
et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Re-
view, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 42 (2012) (“[T]here is no compelling evidence to date of real
economic responses to tax rates . . . at the top of the income distribution.”).
132 See Toder & Rueben, supra note 94, at 128. R
133 See David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital
Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 358 (2015).
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More generally, a consumption tax can do little about a society that
is increasingly dominated by concentrated fortunes and inherited wealth.
When r > g, wealthy families can consume a portion of their investment
income, save the rest, and still watch their share of total wealth grow.  If,
as Piketty forecasts, the real economic growth rate stabilizes at around
1.5% and the pre-tax rate of return on capital remains around 4% (where
it is today),134 a family with $20 million in net assets—the minimum to
be in the top 0.1% in the United States135—will receive $800,000 in
capital income each year (after accounting for inflation).  It can re-invest
$300,000 in order to maintain its proportionate share of society’s
wealth136 and consume the other $500,000—all without working.  A
consumption tax would treat this family the same as another family with
$500,000 in labor income and no income from capital, at least for this
year.
If the family chooses to devote less than $500,000 to consumption,
its share of national wealth will grow over time until it is passed on to the
children, leaving them even better off than their parents.  In Europe, the
increase in total capital and inequality of capital ownership over the past
fifty years has generated a rising volume of gifts and bequests.137  In
France, more than 12% of people born after 1970 will receive more in
inheritances than the average person in the bottom half of the income
distribution will earn from an entire lifetime of work.138  A consumption
tax, no matter how progressive, can have little impact on the accumula-
tion and transmission of wealth because that wealth is not consumed by
definition.139  If we are concerned about inequality of wealth and the
consequent privileging of inheritance over work, a consumption tax is
unlikely to provide much of a solution.
Alternatively, a consumption tax advocate could argue that, at the
end of the day, it is consumption that matters, not income or wealth, and
therefore measures to reduce inequality of income or wealth are beside
the point:140 wealth has no purpose other than consumption and therefore
134 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 356.
135 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, at tbl.1. R
136 $20 million x 1.5% = $300,000.
137 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 425.
138 See id. at 421.
139 One can imagine punitively high consumption tax rates of, for example, 90% for con-
sumption above $1 million per year (so that $1 million in gross income is required to pay for
$100,000 in consumption).  This would force wealthy households to use much more of their
capital income for consumption, leaving less for savings.  The problem is that these tax rates
would also affect households that earn most of their income through labor and would therefore
create a powerful incentive against work.  In addition, the tax rates would remain trivially
small for the wealthiest families, which consume only a tiny fraction of their capital income.
140 See, e.g., Kevin A. Hassett & Aparna Mathur, Op-Ed., Consumption and the Myths of
Inequality, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444
100404577643691927468370.
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should not be taxed until it is consumed.  Even if that consumption oc-
curs in the far-distant future, the taxes that would be paid in the future
have a present value that can be calculated today.141  This view, how-
ever, overlooks the many benefits of wealth other than consumption.142
There is financial security, both for the wealth holder and for any number
of generations of descendants, and the peace of mind that it provides.
Ownership of large stakes in corporations brings influence over those
businesses and the economy in general.  Assets can be built up in family
foundations or donated to charitable organizations, both of which are ex-
empt from taxation, enabling the wealthy to promote their preferred
causes and gain the psychological benefits of altruism.  Charitable contri-
butions are only one way in which wealth confers fame and social status;
think, for example, of Mark Cuban’s ownership of the Dallas Mavericks
or Roman Abramovich’s purchase of Chelsea FC—both of which qualify
as investments rather than consumption goods.143  Money also brings po-
litical influence, especially in the United States, where the super-rich are
financing an increasing proportion of campaign activity.144
Despite its theoretical advantage in economic efficiency, a con-
sumption tax is not an adequate vehicle to address the problem of grow-
ing wealth inequality.  Reducing inequality is itself a societal objective
that could justify some reduction in efficiency, and therefore a tax on
capital could improve overall social welfare.145  For these reasons, we
should attempt to identify what tax policy can best reduce the rate of
return on capital.
IV. AN INCOME TAX ON CAPITAL
In Part II, I discussed some of the shortcomings of an annual net
wealth tax.  This and the following Part discuss whether an alternative
tax could better and more practically reduce the gap between r and g and
thereby slow down the growth of wealth inequality.
An obvious candidate is an income tax on investments.  The return
on capital is the sum of the interest, dividends, rents, and other cash
flows that stem from investment assets, plus the gains realized on the
141 See Shaviro, supra note 117, at 106. R
142 See Toder & Rueben, supra note 94, at 104; Schenk, supra note 84, at 463–65. R
143 Daniel Shaviro argues that the non-consumption benefits of wealth flow from the fact
that wealth can be used for consumption. See Shaviro, supra note 117, at 106.  I am not sure R
this is correct.  For example, Abramovich’s purchase of Chelsea FC is an investment for tax
purposes, yet probably conferred substantial benefits upon him.
144 See generally KENNETH P. VOGEL, BIG MONEY: 2.5 BILLION DOLLARS, ONE SUSPI-
CIOUS VEHICLE, AND A PIMP—ON THE TRAIL OF THE ULTRA-RICH HIJACKING AMERICAN POLIT-
ICS (2014).  Political contributions could be captured by a consumption tax, but overall
influence in the form of connections and access goes beyond actual cash donations.
145 See Toder & Rueben, supra note 94, at 104.  For additional arguments for supplement- R
ing a consumption tax with a wealth tax, see Schenk, supra note 84, at 456–73. R
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sale of those assets.  A tax on all of these cash flows and capital gains
reduces the effective return on capital.  In addition, according to tax the-
ory, a wealth tax is largely equivalent to a capital income tax, at least
under certain assumptions.146  If an annual wealth tax is too difficult to
administer or too controversial to enact, then an income tax is a natural
alternative.  Finally, income taxes on capital have the merit of existing in
some form in all advanced economies, if we include corporate income
taxes,147 and therefore do not face the same administrative, political, and
constitutional challenges as the introduction of a wealth tax.  So perhaps
existing taxes on investment income could be modified to achieve the
goals of Piketty’s wealth tax.148
Unfortunately, an income tax on capital suffers from two major
shortcomings.  First, as discussed above, its impact for most households
(those without access to inframarginal investments) is limited to a frac-
tion of the risk-free rate of return.  Second, in its current form, it allows
investors to reduce their effective tax rate by deferring capital gains—a
benefit that the wealthiest families are most likely to enjoy.
A. Not Big Enough
The fact that we already have capital income taxes is evidence of
their limited effectiveness.  In the United States, for example, both capi-
tal gains and qualified dividends are taxed at a top rate of 23.8%, while
the top rate on interest income is 43.4% (both including the 3.8% Medi-
care surtax on high-income households).149  In addition, corporations pay
income tax at a top rate of 35%, although the average effective tax rate is
significantly lower.150  These tax rates are higher than they were from
2001 until 2013, but comparable to or lower than the top tax rates on
investment income between the late 1970s and 2001,151 a period in
which the top 0.5% of households claimed a steadily increasing share of
total national wealth.152  This implies that current U.S. tax rates are not
146 See supra Part III.C.
147 See Robert Carroll & Gerald Prante, Corporate Dividend and Capital Gains Taxation:
A Comparison of the United States to Other Developed Nations, ERNST & YOUNG (Feb. 2012),
http://images.politico.com/global/2012/02/120208_asidividend.pdf.  A corporate income tax,
by reducing the profits of corporations, is at least in part a tax on equity investments in those
corporations.
148 See Clive Crook, Piketty’s Wealth Tax Isn’t a Joke, BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 11,
2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-11/picketty-s-wealth-tax-isn-t-a-joke.
149 Tax rates quoted for the United States are for federal taxes only.
150 See Martin A. Sullivan, Behind the GAO’s 12.6 Percent Effective Corporate Rate, 149
TAX NOTES 197, 197 (2013).
151 Top Federal Income Tax Rates Since 1913, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, http://
www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).  The maximum rate on capital gains
varied between 20% and 40%, while the maximum rate on interest and dividends varied be-
tween 28% and 70%.
152 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, at fig.1. R
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sufficient to prevent a continual increase in inequality, especially since g
is likely to be lower in the future than in the recent past.  It follows that if
a tax on capital income is to slow down the process of wealth concentra-
tion, it will have to be levied at significantly higher rates than at present.
As discussed above, however, tax theory demonstrates that the im-
pact of an income tax on r is limited by the risk-free rate of return, rF.
For any tax rate t, an investor can use portfolio reallocation to ensure that
the after-tax rate of return is only rFt lower than in a world without taxes.
Clearly, t cannot exceed 100%, and in practice probably cannot approach
100% without triggering an explosion of tax avoidance activity, so the
impact of an income tax on r must be significantly lower than rF.
The real risk-free rate of return is generally thought to be small—on
the order of 0.5% to 1.0%153—which implies that it is impossible for a
capital income tax to reduce r by more than 1 percentage point per year.
The real risk-free rate is usually approximated using the real return on
short-term Treasury bills, which has historically been less than 1%.154
However, the rate of return that is captured by an income tax may be
somewhat higher for two reasons.  The first is inflation.  Current U.S.
income taxes are not indexed for inflation, so taxpayers must pay taxes
even on returns that merely compensate them for rising price levels.
Therefore, the burden of an income tax falls not on the real risk-free rate
of return, but on the nominal risk-free rate, which includes inflation.155
Nominal returns on Treasury bills have historically been considerably
higher than real returns, perhaps as high as 5% on average.156  In recent
years they have been virtually zero,157 however, and with the Federal
Reserve aiming to maintain inflation around 2%,158 the nominal risk-free
rate in the future is likely to be around 2.5% to 3%.
Second, in order to neutralize the impact of an income tax on re-
turns to risk, investors must shift more of their portfolios into risky as-
sets.  At some point (depending on their risk preferences), they will have
to borrow money in order to leverage up their risky investments.  In that
153 See Reed Shuldiner, Commentary, Does the United States Tax Capital Income?, in
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 31, 35 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007). But see id. at 36–37.
154 See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 21 n.23.  In early 2015, the nominal yield on 3- R
month Treasury bills varied between one and four basis points. Daily Treasury Yield Curve
Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).  If inflation
is positive at all, then the real yield on 3-month Treasury bills is negative.
155 Cunningham, supra note 104, at 41; Shaviro, supra note 117, at 101. R
156 The 1-year Treasury bill has averaged a yield of 5.1% since 1953. 1-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/series/GS1 (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).  Data on shorter-term bills are not available for as
long a period.
157 Id.
158 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 2012 Monetary Policy (Jan.
25, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm.
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case, the rate of return that is burdened by an income tax is not the risk-
free rate, but the investor’s personal borrowing rate159—which can ex-
ceed the risk-free rate by 2 or more percentage points.160
To put this in perspective, assume that inflation is 2% and the real
risk-free rate is 1%, so the nominal rate is 3%.  This implies that an
income tax of 50%—higher than any OECD country currently levies on
either dividend or capital gains income161—would only reduce sophisti-
cated investors’ returns by 1.5 percentage points.  (If those investors bor-
row at 2 percentage points above the risk-free rate in order to achieve
their optimal risk levels, then the tax would reduce their returns by 2.5
percentage points.)162  This is a 1.5 percentage point reduction relative to
a world without taxes, so its impact on the real world—which already
has taxes—would be significantly smaller.  Therefore, a 50% income tax
on capital would not close the gap between r and g, particularly if
Piketty’s long-term forecasts are even roughly correct.  A 50% income
tax on capital would only modestly slow the accumulation of wealth
among the very rich; from 1980 to 2012, the average wealth of the top
0.1% of U.S. households grew at an annual rate of 5.4% after inflation
and taxes, and the corresponding figure for the top 0.01% was 6.9%.163
Even a major increase in tax rates on investment income could only
lower those growth rates by a small amount, and they would still remain
well above the 0.9% average growth rate for the bottom 90% of the
population.164
Moreover, an income tax’s impact on returns depends primarily on
inflation and secondarily on investors’ preferred allocations and borrow-
ing rates.  In other words, the ability of the tax system to limit the gap
between r and g would vary tremendously and arbitrarily as inflation
rises and falls.165  Today, for example, with nominal risk-free rates ap-
proaching zero, an income tax should in theory have virtually no impact
on returns to capital.  Even if inflation remains stable, the effectiveness
of the tax will vary across households, with the most conservative and
creditworthy families paying the lowest tax rates.166
159 See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 38. R
160 One financial advisor at a major asset management company said that he could offer a
borrowing rate of LIBOR + 2.5 percentage points to a borrower with assets over $10 million.
See also Cunningham, supra note 104, at 37 n.72 (citing an investment bank that charges R
0.75–4% above the federal funds rate for margin loans).
161 Carroll & Prante, supra note 147, at 11, 13. R
162 The borrowing rate is 3% + 2% = 5%, so the impact of the tax is 50% x 5% = 2.5
percentage points.
163 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, app. at tbl.B3. R
164 See id.
165 See Cunningham, supra note 104, at 41. R
166 See id. at 38.
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B. Realization and Deferral
The realization requirement poses another problem for using an in-
come tax to reduce r.  Because capital gains are not taxed until an asset is
sold, an investor can indefinitely defer taxes on increases in asset values.
To take a simple example, if r = 6%, t = 50%, and an investor sells an
asset after one year, then the after-tax rate of return will be 3%.  If the
investor holds onto the asset for twenty years, by contrast, the annualized
after-tax rate of return will be 3.8%.  After sixty years—a plausible dura-
tion for assets placed in a trust for the next generation—it rises to 4.8%.
In other words, an investor can reduce the tax rate simply by holding
onto assets for a long time (and can do even better by selling assets that
have fallen in value).  As a result, the impact of an income tax differs
across taxpayers, and is lowest for the wealthiest investors, who can af-
ford to hold onto assets for decades or generations.167  At the same time,
the benefits of tax deferral distort investor’s choices between holding and
selling assets.
There are various ways in which capital income could be taxed
when it accrues rather than when it is realized.168  However, accrual-
based taxation would incur the valuation problems discussed above for
the annual wealth tax.  Eliminating the realization requirement would
also be a major change in the current tax system, undermining the pri-
mary advantage of an income tax over a wealth tax: the fact that the
former already exists and only requires an increase in rates.
In summary, although an income tax on capital exists today and
probably contributed to the mitigation of wealth inequality in the twenti-
eth century,169 its effectiveness in reducing the gap between r and g is
limited.  Even at high rates, an income tax cannot reliably reduce r by
more than a fraction of the nominal risk-free rate of return.  In addition,
the realization requirement allows taxpayers to dramatically reduce their
effective tax rates, increasing their after-tax rates of return.  For these
reasons, the income tax is a particularly blunt instrument for slowing the
concentration of wealth; while it can reduce the rate of return on capital,
it does so in a manner that can be arbitrary and regressive rather than
progressive.170  If we are concerned with increasing wealth inequality
due to high returns on investments, an income tax is better than no tax on
capital at all.  But is there an alternative?
167 For a capital income tax to effectively tax the largest fortunes, the step-up of basis
upon death (which currently allows heirs to use the asset value at the time of inheritance as
their cost basis) would have to be eliminated.
168 See, e.g., David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986).
169 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 373.
170 Cunningham, supra note 104, at 43–44. R
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V. A RETROSPECTIVE CAPITAL TAX
The primary challenges facing an annual net wealth tax are the valu-
ation problem and, in the United States, its questionable constitutionality.
The primary deficiency of an income tax is its limited and arbitrary im-
pact on the rate of return.  All of these problems can be solved with a
retrospective tax on capital, as described below.  Such a system assesses
tax liabilities only when an investor receives cash flows from invest-
ments, but calculates those liabilities based on the imputed historical
value of those investments.
A. Basic Concepts
To understand the retrospective capital tax, first consider an income
tax on capital in which taxes are deferred until realization—as they are
today—but with interest.171  Under the current system, deferring taxes
amounts to borrowing money from the government, interest-free, and re-
investing it in the same asset; paying interest on the deferred amount
eliminates this benefit.  Say an investor buys an asset for $100 at the
beginning of year 1.  At the end of year 1, the asset is worth $105; at the
end of year 2, it is sold for $121.  An ordinary income tax considers only
the gross profit—$21 in this case—and collects a percentage of that
profit.  A retrospective tax, by contrast, takes into account when those
$21 of gains accrued; because the investor did not pay taxes at the time
of accrual, interest must now be paid on the tax attributable to prior
years.  In this example, the year 1 gain is $5,172 and the year 2 gain is
$16.173  The taxpayer must pay not only the tax on the year 1 gain, but
also interest on that tax, charged at the after-tax risk-free rate of re-
turn.174  Compared to a traditional income tax, the retrospective tax lia-
bility is higher by the amount of the interest on the tax on the year 1
171 For an early version of this type of tax system, see William Vickrey, Averaging of
Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. ECON. 379, 383–84 (1939).  For a detailed analy-
sis of charging interest on deferred taxes, see Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Propo-
sal for Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 45, 65–73 (1996).
172 $105 – $100 = $5.
173 $121 – $105 = $16.
174 The risk-free rate is appropriate because the tax itself is “risk-free”; it must be paid in
the future, regardless of the investment outcome.  Because the deferred tax is essentially a loan
from the government that the taxpayer chooses to reinvest, the interest on that loan should be
deductible as an investment expense, so the net interest paid should be at the after-tax rate.  To
see this, imagine that the asset in question is a risk-free government bond.  Holding onto the
asset is equivalent to taking a risk-free loan from the government and reinvesting it in a risk-
free bond, which should leave the taxpayer no better or no worse off.  Because the year 2
return on that bond will be taxed, the interest on the year 1 tax must be tax-deductible, or else
the taxpayer will be made worse off.  This is a common but not the only way of thinking about
the interest charge. See Land, supra note 171, at 68. R
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gain.175  An investor can no longer claim an interest-free loan from the
government simply by holding onto an asset, and so the tax system does
not affect the decision to sell the asset or not.
In this form, however, a retrospective tax simply recreates the valu-
ation problem: how do we know that the asset is worth $105 at the end of
year 1?176  One possibility is to assume that the asset appreciated at a
constant annual rate.177  In the example above, we know that the tax-
payer bought the asset for $100 and sold it two years later for $121,
which implies an average annual rate of return of 10%.  So, for tax pur-
poses, we could simply assume that the asset was worth $110 at the end
of year 1.  Then the gain attributable to year 1 is $10,178 and the gain
attributable to year 2 is $11;179 the taxpayer must pay tax on both gains,
plus interest on the tax on the year 1 gain.
Assuming a constant rate of appreciation is easily understandable,
but this approach recreates the deferral problem in a slightly different
form.  If an investor knows that an asset has appreciated unusually rap-
idly in the past—so that its rate of appreciation is likely to be lower in
the future—then there is an incentive to hold onto the asset in order to
spread the extraordinary past gain over a longer period.  Conversely, if
the asset has lost money, there is an incentive to sell it and lock in the
loss and corresponding tax benefit.180  These distortions are less signifi-
cant than for an ordinary income tax, however, which rewards investors
for holding onto any appreciated assets by giving them a lower effective
tax rate.
In the above examples, taxes are assessed as a percentage of income
(capital gains).  Similar methods could be used to implement a retrospec-
tive wealth tax.  Assume that instead of an income tax, we impose a
wealth tax of 2%.  If we know that an asset is worth $100 at the begin-
ning of year 1 and $105 at the beginning of year 2, and is sold for $121 at
the end of year 2, we can collect 2% of its value at the beginning of each
year, plus interest.  Because of the valuation problem, we could alterna-
tively impute the asset’s value at the beginning of year 2 by assuming a
constant rate of appreciation.  Then the imputed value at the beginning of
175 The risk-free rate may appear too low, particularly when the “loan” from the govern-
ment is “reinvested” in a risky asset that yields more than the risk-free rate.  This is mislead-
ing, however, because the successful outcome is only visible after the fact.  When a taxpayer
decides to “reinvest” the year 1 taxes by not selling an asset, it is with knowledge that the
interest must be paid.
176 See Land, supra note 171, at 66. R
177 See Joseph M. Dodge II, The Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers: Where Do We
Go After ERTA?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 738, 763–64 (1982).
178 $110 – $100 = $10.
179 $121 – $110 = $11.
180 See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167,
168 (1991).
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year 2 would be $110.181  If we do the same for all assets, the sum of the
taxes on those assets will amount to a tax on all of the taxpayer’s
wealth—even if the tax due for each asset may be paid in a different
future year.
In short, either an income tax or a wealth tax can be based on histor-
ical asset values, actual or imputed.  Using imputed values solves the
problems of identification, valuation, and liquidity (for a wealth tax), but
does not eliminate the problem of deferral (for an income tax).
B. Imputing Past Values at the Risk-Free Rate of Return
A retrospective capital tax can be designed to solve the deferral
problem, preventing investors from lowering their effective tax rates
through decisions to hold or sell assets.  This approach was first
presented by Alan Auerbach as a method for calculating capital gains
under an income tax.182  The solution is to assume, when a taxpayer sells
an asset, that it appreciated at a constant rate equal to the risk-free rate of
return from the beginning of the holding period to the end.183  For exam-
ple, assume that the risk-free rate is 3%.  A taxpayer buys an asset at the
beginning of year 1 and sells it at the end of year 2 for $106.09.  The
retrospective tax assigns the asset an imputed value of $100 at the begin-
ning of year 1 and $103 at the beginning of year 2—because $100 in-
vested at 3% per year would result in $103 after one year and $106.09
after two years.184  The actual purchase price of the asset is irrelevant;
only the sale price and the holding period are necessary to calculate the
tax.185
Under this approach, the imputed historical asset values of $100 and
$103 are used to calculate the capital gains for each year of the holding
period.  Taxes on those capital gains are then due, with interest, when the
asset is finally sold.  In the above example, the imputed capital gains are
$3 for year 1 and $3.09 for year 2;186 when the asset is sold, the taxpayer
owes tax on those gains, plus interest on the year 1 tax.  At any moment
in time, an investor is indifferent between (a) holding the asset and (b)
selling it, paying the associated tax, and reinvesting the proceeds in the
181 The year 1 value would still be $100.
182 See  Auerbach, supra note 180.  For an expansion of Auerbach’s approach, see David
F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency, and Correctness in the
Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731 (1995).
183 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 172. R
184 $100 x (1 + 3%) = $103; $103 x (1 + 3%) = $106.09.  Auerbach’s paper is written in
continuous time, meaning that returns compound continuously. See generally id.  The exam-
ples here are written in discrete time for ease of understanding and because a real-world tax
system would probably be designed in discrete time.
185 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 171–72. R
186 $103 – $100 = $3 and $106.09 –  $103 = $3.09.
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same asset; the taxes paid if the asset is sold now are a partial prepay-
ment of the taxes expected to be owed in the future if the asset is sold
later.187  Therefore, this retrospective tax avoids the deferral problem
faced by a traditional income tax.
It may seem counterintuitive to calculate capital gains by disregard-
ing the historical cost of an asset and instead assuming that it earned the
risk-free rate of return.  In other words, the tax liability does not depend
on the actual gain: investors A and B who sell (different) assets for $100
pay the same tax, even if A paid $1 for one asset a year before (gaining
$99 of income) while B paid $199 for the other asset (yielding a $99
loss).  As with any income tax, however, an investor can adjust the port-
folio allocation so that the retrospective tax will have the same impact on
eventual returns in every state of the world.  After the fact, it may seem
unfair to pay tax on an asset that lost money, but proper allocation before
the fact can make the impact of the tax independent of whether the asset
rises or falls in value.188
Although Auerbach initially framed this retrospective tax as an in-
come tax, it can just as easily be seen as a wealth tax.189  As discussed in
the previous section, a retrospective wealth tax assesses a tax on each
asset when it is sold, but calculates that liability as a function of its value
in each year that it was held by the investor.  Again, assume an investor
buys an asset for $100 and sells it two years later for $106.09, so the
imputed beginning-of-year asset values are $100 and $103, and in each
year the asset has an imputed return of 3%.  A 40% income tax will
collect 40% of that 3% imputed return for each year (plus interest for
year 1).  Since 40% x 3% = 1.2%, this “income tax” is identical to a
1.2% wealth tax levied on beginning-of-year asset values.  This is true
for any sale price and any holding period, since the imputed rate of return
is always the same (3%).
This identity is stronger than merely stating (as in Part III.C) that an
income tax is theoretically equivalent to a wealth tax.  That earlier equiv-
alence assumed that, through optimal portfolio allocation choices, inves-
tors make themselves indifferent between an income tax and a wealth
tax.  The conclusion here is that, if we impute past asset values by as-
suming the risk-free rate of return, an income tax at rate t is literally
identical to a wealth tax at rate rFt in that they will collect exactly the
same amount of money, after the fact, for any asset sale.
187 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 171. R
188 See Noe¨l B. Cunningham, Observations on Retrospective Taxation, 53 TAX L. REV.
489, 492–94 (2000).
189 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 176. R
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C. Reducing r with a Retrospective Capital Tax
Deborah Schenk has discussed using a retrospective wealth tax,
along with a consumption tax, as a substitute for the current income tax
system.190  Her motivation was to “replicate the burden imposed by an
income tax . . . in a simpler form,”191 and therefore her analysis focused
on the various advantages of a wealth tax over an income tax, at least in
the real world.192  In this Article, I evaluate a retrospective capital tax as
a policy tool to reduce the rate of return on investments and the growth
of wealth inequality.  This section explains why such a tax is superior to
both an annual wealth tax and a traditional income tax.
A retrospective capital tax solves the valuation problem faced by a
wealth tax because it is based on final sale prices, not intermediate val-
ues.  It solves the deferral problem faced by an income tax by making
investors indifferent between selling and holding assets.  The retrospec-
tive tax also solves the other major problem with an income tax—the
constraint imposed by the risk-free rate and the difficulty of calibrating
the tax’s impact on r.  Recall that a 50% income tax will only reduce r by
50% of the risk-free rate; higher tax rates are of course possible, but will
trigger increasing levels of tax avoidance and distorted investment
choices.  By contrast, the retrospective capital tax, like a wealth tax, can
be imposed at an arbitrarily high rate.  For example, if the risk-free rate is
3%, the retrospective tax can still reduce r by 3 percentage points.193  It
is more intuitive to do so by calling it a 3% wealth tax, but we could just
as easily call it a 100% income tax.  Since the tax is calculated by assum-
ing the risk-free rate of return, investors keep any returns that exceed the
risk-free rate.  Conversely, if investors earn less than the risk-free rate,
their taxes will exceed their returns.  Therefore, investors still have the
incentive to seek out high returns—which is not the case with a 100%
income tax.
The impact of a retrospective capital tax—the number of percentage
points by which it reduces r—is also much more robust than that of a
traditional income tax.  As discussed above, a retrospective tax elimi-
nates the ability of investors to reduce their effective tax rate through
deferral.  In addition, the portfolio adjustments dictated by the retrospec-
tive tax are much smaller than those dictated by a traditional income
tax.194  The implication is that investors are much less likely to need to
190 See Schenk, supra note 84, at 448–53.  Schenk’s main proposal is to implement a
wealth tax; however, a retrospective wealth tax is only one possible design for such a tax. See
id. at 424–25.
191 Id. at 424–25.
192 See id. at 474–75.
193 See supra Part III.C.
194 A retrospective tax absorbs far less risk than a traditional income tax; for example, a
traditional income tax absorbs a share of losses as well as gains, while a retrospective tax
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borrow in order to make those adjustments, and therefore the impact of
the tax is unlikely to be affected by their borrowing rates.
Furthermore, the impact of the retrospective tax does not depend
directly on inflation.  A traditional income tax (not indexed for inflation)
claims a share of investment returns that simply compensate for rising
prices.  The impact of an income tax on r is equal to the tax rate times the
nominal risk-free rate, which includes inflation, and therefore varies
widely with fluctuations in inflation.  For example, if the real risk-free
rate is 1% and inflation rises from 0% to 4%, the nominal risk-free rate
will rise from 1% to 5%, and the impact of a 50% income tax on r will
increase from 0.5 percentage points to 2.5 percentage points.  The impact
of the retrospective tax, by contrast, does not fluctuate with inflation, or
even with the real risk-free rate—so long as the tax is calculated as a
percentage of wealth (asset values) rather than income (capital gains).
To see this, consider the case of assets that are held for only one year.  If
the risk-free rate is 3%, then a 40% retrospective income tax and a 1.2%
retrospective wealth tax will result in exactly the same tax liability, since
40% of the imputed gain is the same as 1.2% of the imputed prior-year
asset value; each will reduce r by 1.2 percentage points (of the imputed
prior-year value).  If the risk-free rate rises to 5%, however, a 40% in-
come tax will now reduce r by 2 percentage points,195 while a 1.2%
wealth tax will still reduce r by 1.2 percentage points.196  If the tax is
calculated as a percentage of asset values, inflation never enters into the
equation.197
A retrospective wealth tax has another advantage as an instrument
for reducing r.  Recall that, compared to a traditional income tax, a retro-
spective income tax may seem unfair because the tax liability is indepen-
dent of whether an investor made or lost money: if an asset is sold for
$100, the tax is the same whether the investor paid $1 or $199 for it.
Compared to a traditional wealth tax that is imposed annually, however,
the perspective reverses.198  The fortunate investor who bought an asset
for $1 and sold it a year later for $100 pays “too much” tax under the
retrospective system, which assumes that the asset was worth much more
than $1 when it was purchased ($100, discounted at the risk-free rate of
imposes a positive tax even on top of a capital loss. See Cunningham, supra note 188, at R
492–94.
195 40% x 5% = 2%.
196 See Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 16, at 487–88. R
197 This follows from the fact that a retrospective tax does not use historical cost informa-
tion, so the question of indexing does not arise in the first place.  Either the real or the nominal
risk-free rate can be used to impute historical asset values and to charge interest on taxes for
past years; as long as the tax is calculated as a percentage of imputed asset values, the two
methods will result in the same current-year tax liabilities.
198 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 176. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP104.txt unknown Seq: 37 23-DEC-15 16:57
2015] REDUCING INEQUALITY 227
return), and hence overestimates the investor’s past wealth.  By contrast,
the unfortunate investor who paid $199 and sold for $100 pays “too lit-
tle” tax because the retrospective formula assumes the asset was worth
much less than $199.  From the standpoint of reducing r, this is a good
thing.  The family that loses money on its investments is under-taxed
(relative to a traditional wealth tax), which is fine because its rate of
return is already negative; the family that is extraordinarily lucky is over-
taxed, which is fine because its rate of return is extremely high.  While
the retrospective capital tax reduces r by the same amount for all taxpay-
ers from an ex ante perspective, from an ex post perspective it has the
greatest impact on taxpayers with the highest rates of return.
For these reasons, although a retrospective income tax and a retro-
spective wealth tax are functionally identical (as long as the risk-free rate
is unchanged), it is preferable to assess the tax as a percentage of im-
puted asset values and hence imputed wealth.  Then a single tax rate can
be preserved from year to year and will have a consistent impact on r.
Finally, despite its economic effects, this retrospective capital tax is
not a “direct tax” and therefore does not run afoul of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.  Regardless of what we call the tax, it does not tax property simply
by virtue of its possession.  Although the meaning of “direct tax” is not
entirely clear, it appears that a tax on “the use of property or its transfer”
does not qualify as a direct tax.199  The retrospective tax, like a capital
gains tax, is triggered by a sale and not by the fact of ownership; because
it uses imputed rather than actual asset values, it does not tax actual
wealth in any case.  The amount of the tax is based entirely on the sale
price and the holding period (as well as the risk-free rate, which is a
parameter of the system), which are already used to calculate capital
gains taxes.  Structurally, then, the retrospective tax is an income tax,
only formulated differently.
D. A Proposal
This section describes how a retrospective capital tax could work in
practical terms.  The specifics of the proposal, such as the tax rates, are
designed for the United States.
1. The Basics
Most household wealth is in the form of assets that are bought at
some time and later sold or redeemed—real estate, stocks, bonds, etc.200
Some of these assets do not generate cash flows until they are sold, such
199 Barry L. Isaacs, Do We Want a Wealth Tax in America?, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 23,
29–30 (1977) (arguing that taxing an increase in the value of property is a direct tax “without a
sale or other disposition”).
200 See Wolff, supra note 49, at 47.
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as artworks, zero-coupon bonds, or growth stocks that do not pay divi-
dends.  Under this proposal, they are taxed according to the model de-
scribed above: when sold, the assets’ historical values are imputed using
the risk-free rate of return, which is based on the yields of short-term
Treasury bills.201  The tax for each year that the taxpayer held the asset is
calculated as t times the imputed value of the asset in that year; then
interest is added to that base amount, using the risk-free rate.
Many assets that are bought and sold also generate interim cash
flows, including dividend-paying stocks, most bonds, and rental proper-
ties.  It would be incorrect to ignore those cash flows: a bond that pays
interest is clearly worth more than a zero-coupon bond with the same
face value, even though their final redemption value is the same.  Under
the retrospective capital tax, each cash flow is treated as a realization
event just like a final sale.202  For example, buying a ten-year Treasury
bond paying semiannual interest is equivalent to buying twenty-one dif-
ferent securities: twenty that pay interest on different dates (the “cou-
pons”) and one that repays the principal on the maturity date.  Receiving
an interest payment is the same as selling a coupon and is treated as such:
the value of the coupon is imputed using the risk-free rate for each year
in the taxpayer’s holding period, and the tax is calculated as a percentage
of that value plus interest.
Some household wealth is held in assets that do not precisely fit the
model above.  A defined benefit pension plan, for example, pays a
stream of cash flows (typically after retirement), which can be treated as
realization events.203  The appropriate holding period for taxing those
cash flows is not obvious from the way we usually think about pensions.
To solve this problem, each distribution must be matched with one or
more corresponding contribution dates (when the employer or the em-
ployee put money into the plan); this is no more complicated than match-
ing share sales and purchases for stocks, ETFs, or mutual funds, and
should be no problem for computers.204  Life insurance policies present
the same issue as defined benefit plans: policyholders contribute money
(premiums) on some schedule and receive cash flows later in various
forms—dividends, cash surrender value, or death benefits.  Again, cash
201 Although either a nominal or a real risk-free rate could be used, as discussed in Part
V.C, a nominal rate is preferable because it is easier to reconcile with people’s perceptions of
asset values.
202 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 175.
203 A defined contribution pension plan is simply an account that is used to buy and sell
assets, so it can be taxed like any other investment account.
204 The simplest rule would be to require first-in, first-out accounting, in which the first
distribution is matched to the first contributions, the second distribution is matched to the next
contributions, and so on.
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flows received from the policy need to be matched with premiums paid
in order to identify the appropriate holding period.
Liquid wealth in savings accounts and checking accounts, which
hold “money” rather than securities or other assets, present a similar
problem: we do not generally think of bank accounts as containing assets
that are bought and sold.  There are several possible ways to tax these
accounts.  One is to treat dollar deposits as assets that are bought and
sold: depositing $100 is equivalent to buying one hundred $1 claims on
the bank, and withdrawing $50 the next day is equivalent to selling fifty
of those claims back to the bank.205  Each withdrawal, then, is a realiza-
tion event, and needs to be matched with a specific deposit or deposits to
determine the holding period.206  Banks will have to keep track of the
specific dollars in each account—when they were deposited and when
they were withdrawn.  This is precisely the same computational prob-
lem—matching sales and purchases—that exists for brokerage or mutual
fund accounts.207  A holding period also must be assigned to each inter-
est payment: this is the average holding period for whatever “dollars” are
in the account at the time the interest is paid.
A second solution is to exempt accounts paying low interest rates
from the tax altogether.  Since the goal of the tax is to reduce the rate of
return on capital, there is no particular need to tax assets that have very
low returns.208  For example, the exemption could apply to accounts
earning negative real rates of return, as indicated by a benchmark.  As of
September 2015, the markets expected inflation over the next five years
to average about 1.2% per year;209 since the highest advertised savings
account rates are around 1%,210 all such accounts are likely to lose
money in real terms.  Financial institutions that want to pay higher rates
of interest could be required to treat withdrawals as distributions and
match them with deposits, as described above.211
205 This is literally true, since bank deposits are instantaneous-term loans to the bank.
206 In practice, taxes are assessed annually, so the withdrawals in a year must be matched
to one or more years in the past when an equivalent amount of money was deposited.
207 Money market funds are functionally similar to bank accounts since they behave as if
they hold dollars, not shares.  But they actually do hold shares and can be taxed just like other
mutual funds.
208 This point applies to currency in particular.  If someone stuffs $100,000 in bills under
a mattress, that money will escape the retrospective capital tax, but it will also earn a nominal
rate of return of zero.
209 5-year Breakeven Inflation Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, http://research.st
louisfed.org/fred2/series/T5YIEM (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
210 See Savings Accounts, NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/rates/savings-ac
count/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
211 Alternatively, the Federal Reserve could set maximum interest rates for bank accounts,
as it did historically under Regulation Q, which would be exempt from the retrospective tax.
Banks could offer higher rates but only through money market accounts, which would be taxed
like all other mutual fund accounts.  A third solution is to use actual account balances for tax
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In addition to taxing cash flows from assets, a retrospective tax must
account for liabilities.  A person with $10 million in assets and no debt
should not be treated the same as a person with $10 million in assets and
$9 million in debt.  This can be done by treating liabilities as assets in
reverse.  If taxpayer A borrows $1 million from taxpayer B, that loan is
an asset from B’s perspective, and B will pay retrospective capital tax on
it when repaid by A.  It follows that the loan is a negative asset from A’s
perspective, and A should receive tax credits while repaying it.212  (From
the standpoint of the government, the loan does not create or destroy any
wealth, so the total amount of tax should remain the same.)  From either
perspective, the historical value of each cash flow is imputed using the
risk-free rate, and the taxes (or credits) for past years are then grossed up
with interest.
If we assume that all assets will be sold, all pension or life insurance
claims will be paid out, and all dollars in bank accounts will be with-
drawn,213 then the retrospective capital tax will eventually tax the im-
puted value of all wealth in each year (unless there is an exemption for
bank accounts with negative real rates of return).  For example, assume
that, at the beginning of 2015, a taxpayer has $100,000 in a savings ac-
count, $100,000 in Treasury bonds maturing in 2025, and a Picasso
painting.  For tax purposes, the taxpayer’s 2015 wealth will be assessed
as follows: the 2015 value of the savings account will be calculated as
$100,000 of withdrawals are made; part of the value of the bonds will be
imputed each time there is an interest payment, and the 2015 value will
only be fully assessed upon receipt of the principal payment in 2025; and
the 2015 value of the painting will be imputed when the painting is sold,
say in 2035.  At that point, the taxpayer will have paid the full retrospec-
tive capital tax on 2015 wealth, plus interest.
2. Death and the Estate Tax
This illustration raises one pressing question: what if the taxpayer
never sells the painting?  Then that portion of 2015 wealth will never be
assessed and will escape from the tax.  One possible response is that an
asset that is never sold has no rate of return, and therefore is no reason
for concern.  This not a satisfactory answer, however, since the benefits
purposes.  For other assets, the value in year Y1 for tax purposes is imputed when the asset is
finally sold in year Y2; for liquid accounts, the tax could be based on the actual value in Y1 and
assessed at the same time.  One possible problem is that this might distort investors’ choices
between different assets subject to different tax methodologies.  A more serious problem in the
United States is that basing the tax on actual account balances could make it unconstitutional.
212 See Cunningham, supra note 188, at 495–96. R
213 This does not assume that all bank accounts will eventually be closed.  If we apply
first-in, first-out accounting to the dollars in bank accounts, we are only assuming that a dollar
deposited today will eventually be withdrawn.
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of wealth go beyond simply liquidating it for consumption, as discussed
in Part III.D.  In addition, suppose the taxpayer leaves the painting to a
grandson, who sells it many decades later.  At that point, the painting’s
2015 value will be imputed from the sale price and the grandson will
have to pay tax on that value, with interest.  Even though the government
will be “made whole” at that point, the family’s wealth will have grown
at a pre-tax rate of return in the interim.214  This is arguably a disadvan-
tage of the retrospective tax compared to an annual wealth tax.
This is a problem with any realization-based tax system.  The solu-
tion proposed here is to treat death as a realization event.  Upon death,
each of the decedent’s assets is valued—an exercise already required by
the estate tax, which exists in many advanced economies—and the as-
sessed value is used in place of a true sale price to impute prior year
values and calculate retrospective taxes.  The person inheriting the asset
then begins a new holding period, since the decedent’s estate has paid
taxes for the period until death.  This approach does not create any ad-
ministrative difficulties that do not exist with an estate tax.  From a pol-
icy perspective, “settling up” a taxpayer’s retrospective capital tax bill at
death is appropriate.  One might argue that a taxpayer who chooses not to
sell assets has some right to defer the tax associated with those assets
(and thereby to enjoy a pre-tax rate of return on capital)—already a de-
batable proposition—but even then it’s hard to see why that right should
transfer to the taxpayer’s heirs.  More importantly, imposing the retro-
spective capital tax at death serves the useful function of limiting the
transfer of family fortunes across generations.  Even if a wealthy person
can largely avoid the tax by minimizing asset sales while alive, this pro-
vision ensures that the rate of return is retrospectively reduced by the full
amount of the tax for all of those years, so heirs only benefit from an
after-tax rate of return.215
Triggering realization at death also means that the retrospective cap-
ital tax can replace the estate tax.  The primary purpose of the estate tax
is to limit the transmission of inherited wealth, based on the principle
that a person’s right to enjoy accumulated wealth does not fully extend to
heirs.  The estate tax is also a tax of last resort; its existence tacitly ac-
knowledges that the income tax does not do a good job at limiting returns
on capital.  The retrospective capital tax fulfills both of these objectives.
Seen as a wealth tax, it imposes a constant annual burden on r, slowing
the growth of great fortunes.  Since it is imposed at death, it prevents
wealth from accumulating at a pre-tax rate of return for more than one
lifetime.  Finally, the retrospective capital tax suffers from less political
214 I discuss the estate tax later in this subsection.
215 To prevent the obvious tax avoidance strategy of giving away assets before death, gifts
must also be treated as realization events.
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baggage than the estate tax, which is routinely demonized as double taxa-
tion (since the decedent’s wealth was supposedly taxed when it was re-
ceived as income) or as a form of class warfare.  By contrast, imposing
the retrospective capital tax at death can be framed as an administrative
means of collecting taxes that are due under a general system.216
3. Progressivity
The retrospective capital tax, like the annual wealth tax proposed by
Piketty, should be progressive for two important reasons.  First, families
with relatively modest investments (compared to the truly wealthy) are
unlikely to be able to save most of their investment returns.  A large
proportion of the wealth of upper middle class households often consists
of equity in their homes, and they are consuming the return on those
homes by living in them.  Another significant proportion of “middle
class” wealth is in retirement accounts that largely will be drawn down in
retirement.  Second, the largest fortunes tend to enjoy the highest rates of
return of capital.  This is true of university endowments, which see aver-
age real rates of return exceeding 8%, with the largest endowments earn-
ing the highest returns.217  It must be true of billionaires as well, since
their wealth appears to grow at a real rate of more than 6% per year, even
after taxes and consumption.218  The net effect of higher returns and
lower consumption (as a proportion of returns) is that household wealth
grows much faster for rich families than for poor families, and much
faster for the super-rich than for the merely rich.
In the United States from 1980 to 2012, for example, real family
wealth (after taxes and inflation) grew by 0.9% per year for the bottom
90% of the wealth distribution, 1.5% for the next 9% (from the 90th to
the 99th percentile), 2.7% for the next 0.9% (from the 99th to the 99.9th
percentile), and 5.4% for the top 0.1%.219  These growth rates imply that
wealth concentration is simply not a problem until we get near the top of
the distribution, and there is little reason to impose any capital tax at all
on families that are not getting significantly richer in the first place.  For
these reasons, the proposed retrospective capital tax has an annual ex-
emption amount and then a schedule of increasing tax rates.220  If the
exemption is $1 million for 2015, for example, a family will not pay any
retrospective tax for imputed 2015 wealth until the sum of that imputed
wealth exceeds $1 million.  This might not occur for several years, de-
216 Triggering the retrospective tax at death does not pose a constitutional problem in the
United States.  Structurally, in this case it is an estate tax with a formula including not only
asset values but also their holding periods.
217 See PIKETTY, supra note 7, at 448.
218 See id. at 435.
219 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, app. at tbl.B3. R
220 For details, see infra Part V.D.6.
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pending on the timing of investment returns, or (more likely) will never
occur at all.  Higher marginal rates at higher wealth thresholds can be
treated the same way.  With a large exemption, we can also eliminate
existing tax breaks for pension plans and Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs).  Today, those preferences allow investment income within retire-
ment savings vehicles to escape tax.  Under the retrospective capital tax,
no additional preference will be necessary because the vast majority of
people will be exempt from taxes on investment income to begin with; in
effect, all of their investments will behave like Roth IRAs (no deduction
from labor taxes, but no taxes paid on withdrawal).221
4. Pass-Through Taxation
In the United States today, different types of business entities are
taxed in different ways.  A typical corporation pays income tax at the
entity level and then may distribute some of its profits as dividends to
shareholders, who pay individual income tax on those dividends.  A sole
proprietorship or a general partnership does not pay tax at the entity
level; instead, its profits are “passed through” to its owners and appear as
income on their individual tax returns.  Some other types of business
entities, such as S corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs),
can elect to be taxed using the partnership model.
Compared to pass-through taxation, corporate taxation makes possi-
ble two types of tax rate arbitrage.222  First, corporations can decide
whether to pay dividends, which will force shareholders to pay income
taxes, or to retain earnings, which allows shareholders to defer taxes until
they take them in the form of capital gains in the future.223  Second, if the
shareholders of a closely-held corporation are also among its employees,
they can pay themselves artificially low salaries, boosting corporate prof-
its.224  Consequently, for each dollar of salary that they give up, they
(collectively) can take an additional dollar of dividends or reinvest the
dollar, which should produce capital gains in the future.  This is a profit-
able strategy if the tax rates on investment income are lower than the tax
rates on labor income.  This opportunity does not arise in a classic corpo-
ration with widely distributed ownership because any employees, even
top executives, who lower their salaries will have to share the higher
profits proportionately with all the shareholders.  The proposed retro-
spective capital tax prevents the first type of arbitrage by eliminating the
221 If we need an incentive to encourage people to save for retirement, it could be deliv-
ered as a direct subsidy in the form of a partial government match rather than the tax prefer-
ences that exist today.
222 See JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34229, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4–6 (2012).
223 See id. at 4–5.
224 See id.
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benefit of deferral.  However, it makes arbitraging between capital and
labor income even more attractive, at least for people with relatively
modest wealth.  If their wealth is low enough to be exempt from the
retrospective tax, they have a very strong incentive to characterize labor
income as capital income.225
This implies that pass-through taxation—in which business profits
are treated as ordinary income of the business owners—should be main-
tained for sole proprietorships, general partnerships, and similar enti-
ties.226  For these businesses, profits should not be treated like stock
dividends that are subject to the retrospective capital tax when distributed
to shareholders, but instead should be treated as ordinary income.  Sales
of ownership stakes in these businesses, however, should be subject to
the retrospective tax like any other capital dispositions.  In effect, ongo-
ing profits of closely-held businesses are treated as labor income of their
owners under a traditional income tax, while capital gains from the sales
of those businesses are subject to the retrospective tax.
Maintaining pass-through taxation will then motivate many small
businesses to switch to corporate taxation, either by changing their tax
election or by incorporating, so that they can characterize labor income
as corporate profits.  Therefore, corporate taxation will have to be pro-
hibited for business owners who could benefit from this type of arbitrage.
This category clearly includes businesses that are entirely owned by one
or more employees, for whom every dollar of (taxed) labor compensation
foregone is an additional dollar of (potentially untaxed) return on capi-
tal.227  It should also include businesses that are mainly owned by em-
ployees or family members of employees, in order to prevent the more
obvious ways to manipulate the system.  In addition, tax authorities
should retain the ability to audit whether any corporation is paying artifi-
cially low labor compensation for tax arbitrage purposes.
5. Tax Simplification
In addition to the estate tax, the retrospective capital tax can replace
two other types of taxes.228  The first is existing taxes on individual in-
vestment income.  (Taxes on labor income should remain the same for
225 That said, this problem already exists today.  Households making less than $74,900 in
2015 pay no tax on qualified dividends or long-term capital gains, so they already have an
incentive to shift labor income into corporate profits.
226 Limited partnership interests can be treated like stocks or bonds because limited part-
ners provide no labor; hence, there is no labor-capital arbitrage opportunity.
227 At the other extreme, it is hard to see the CEO of a Fortune 500 corporation accepting
lower labor compensation because the CEO will get back only a tiny share of the forgone
compensation in the form of increased wealth (via share ownership).
228 S. Douglas Hopkins similarly recommends replacing existing taxes on investments
with an annual wealth tax. Hopkins, supra note 42, at 1309. R
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the purposes of this proposal.)  In principle, investments only need to be
taxed once: whether they are taxed as a percentage of asset values or a
percentage of returns, the result is to reduce the rate of return (and collect
revenues for the government).  A progressive, retrospective capital tax
can shift the burden of capital taxation from families that are treading
water to those that are continually becoming richer.
Second, and perhaps more controversially, the retrospective capital
tax can replace the corporate income tax.  The corporate income tax ex-
ists for two practical reasons.  The first is to increase the progressivity of
the overall tax system by attempting to tax owners of capital.  The sec-
ond is to defend the individual income tax against the arbitrage opportu-
nities described above—reinvesting profits to defer taxes and
characterizing labor income as capital income—by collecting at least
some tax at the entity level.  But from a theoretical perspective, the cor-
porate income tax is unnecessary.  If corporations do not pay taxes on
their profits, their shareholders will receive larger dividends or larger
capital gains, and therefore their income taxes will already rise under the
existing tax system.229
As discussed above, the retrospective capital tax can be made as
progressive as desired by increasing tax rates on wealthier households.
In addition, the retrospective tax can nullify both tax avoidance strategies
by eliminating the benefits of deferral and requiring pass-through taxa-
tion for closely held companies.  For corporations themselves, as a result,
the income tax can be eliminated.  This will only increase the overall
progressivity of the tax system.  Corporate taxes today are effectively
paid both by capital owners and by employees, in proportions that are
difficult to measure.230  To the extent that taxes fall on capital owners,
they affect all investors equally, with no progressivity.  Eliminating those
taxes will make corporations more valuable by shifting the tax burden to
the retrospective capital tax, which can be designed to be explicitly
progressive.
6. Rates
This proposal is designed to be roughly revenue neutral, for three
reasons.  First, if taxes on capital do reduce savings and economic
growth, then maintaining the current level of such taxes should make
229 Corporate shares may be owned by tax-exempt entities.  Without a corporate income
tax, income distributed to those entities would escape taxation entirely.  The more fundamental
issue, however, is the existence of the tax exemption in the first place.  Tax-exempt entities
receive interest on bonds, for example, which already escapes taxation (since interest is tax
deductible by the issuer).
230 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Who Ultimately Pays the Corporate Income Tax?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 23, 2010), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/who-ultimately-pays-the-cor
porate-income-tax/.
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matters no worse than they are today.  Similarly, if the tax change does
not increase the total tax burden, it should not have the overall effect of
making people less willing to live in the United States; if some people
will see their taxes rise, others will see their taxes fall.  Finally, as dis-
cussed in Part VI, revenue neutrality makes tax reform more palatable
from a political perspective.
Therefore, the retrospective tax will have to raise enough federal tax
revenue to replace the corporate income tax, the estate tax, and all indi-
vidual income taxes on capital, except for taxes on income that is passed
through from businesses.231  Table 1 displays the average amount of tax
revenue brought in by these taxes over the 2002–2012 period, expressed
as a percentage of GDP.232  On average, income from capital made up
30.4% of the total income captured by the individual income tax.  How-
ever, this figure includes income from sole proprietorships, partnerships,
and S corporations, for which I propose to maintain pass-through taxa-
tion.  The retrospective tax only needs to replace the tax collected on the
remaining types of income from capital—taxable interest, dividends,
rents, estate and trust income, and taxable pensions233—which together
amount to 19.3% of taxable individual income.  Assuming that income
from capital is taxed at roughly the same rate as income overall,234 the
retrospective tax needs to replace 19.3% of existing individual income
taxes, as well as all corporate taxes and estate taxes, for a total of 3.2% of
GDP.235  If 2012 had been an average year, the dollar value of these
taxes would have been about $517 billion.  (As it was, taxes in 2012
231 States could choose to follow the federal government’s lead and replace their existing
taxes on capital with a lower-rate version of the retrospective capital tax, but state rates would
vary.
232 This period includes all years after the 2001 tax cut and the 2001 recession for which
data is provided by Saez and Zucman.
233 As discussed in Part V.D.3, pensions will be covered by the retrospective tax, not the
existing income tax, so that tax revenue does need to be replaced.  Because contributions to
defined contribution pension plans will no longer be deductible, however, switching to the
retrospective tax will increase income tax revenue; that increase is not reflected in these esti-
mates.  Therefore, this is a high estimate of the amount of revenue that will need to be replaced
by the retrospective tax.
234 This seems plausible as a rough estimate: the tax rates on capital income are lower
than on labor income, although this is offset by the fact that capital income goes disproportion-
ately to high-income households.  From 2002 through 2011, the average effective income tax
rate (total taxes divided by total income) was 12.9%. See All Individual Income Tax Returns:
Sources of Income and Tax Items, Tax Years 1913-2011, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=564.  During this period, the maxi-
mum tax rate for qualified dividends and long-term capital gains was 15%; together, dividends
and capital gains made up 79% of all capital income (excluding income from sole proprietor-
ships, partnerships, and S corporations). See id.
235 As seen in Table 1, individual income taxes collect 7.1% of GDP.  19.3% x 7.1% =
1.4% of GDP.
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were slightly lower than 3.2% of GDP, so the taxes that I propose to
replace only brought in about $494 billion.)
TABLE 1
TAXES TO BE REPLACED BY RETROSPECTIVE TAX
2002–2012
Average as Share 2012 Actuals
of GDP (billions)
Corporate Income Tax 1.7% $242
Estate Tax 0.2% $14
Individual Income Tax (total) 7.1% $1,132
Attributable to capital 2.0% $344
Attributable to capital ex-business income 1.4% $238
Note: Dollar figures are in current 2012 dollars.  “Attributable to capital” includes net
business income, taxable interest, dividends, net rents, estate and trust income, net real-
ized capital gains, and taxable pensions; this is an overestimate because it encompasses
all taxable pensions, including distributions of initial contributions.  “Attributable to capi-
tal ex-business income” is the same except for net business income.236
In order to estimate the impact of different retrospective tax rates,
we need to understand the overall wealth distribution.  In a recent paper,
Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman have compiled detailed estimates
of wealth ownership in the United States, by asset class, for various seg-
ments of the distribution.237  The overall wealth distribution in 2012 is
summarized in Table 2.  For example, households in the top 1%, outside
of the top 0.5%, had at least $3,964,000 in net assets; had an average of
$5,016,000 in net assets; and had a total of $4 trillion in net assets, or
7.3% of total household wealth.
236 Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, app. at tbl.A5; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. R
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV-
ERNMENT tbls.2.1 & 2.5 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy
2015/assets/hist.pdf; U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT AC-
COUNTS tbl.1.1.5 (2012), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&
step=3&isuri=1&903=5.
237 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, at tbl.1. R
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TABLE 2
U.S. WEALTH DISTRIBUTION, 2012
Avg. Real
Lower Average Growth Total
Threshold Wealth Rate, Wealth
Household Groups (Thousands) (Thousands) 1980–2012 (Trillions) Share
Bottom 90% — $87 0.9% $12.6 22.8%
Top 10–5% $662 $865 1.2% $7.0 12.6%
Top 5–1% $1,207 $1,958 1.6% $12.6 22.8%
Top 1%–0.5% $3,964 $5,016 2.3% $4.0 7.3%
Top 0.5%–0.1% $6,495 $10,738 3.0% $6.9 12.5%
Top 0.1%–0.01% $20,561 $41,155 4.3% $6.0 10.8%
Top 0.01% $111,100 $385,157 6.9% $6.2 11.2%
All — $343 2.1% $55.2 100%
Note: Dollar figures are in current 2012 dollars.238
Conceptually speaking, the tax base for the retrospective capital tax
is the Total Wealth column of Table 2.  Although the tax is based on
asset values that are imputed from ongoing cash flows and final sales that
will occur in the future, it is equivalent to a wealth tax on an ex ante
basis239 and thus should have approximately the same economic impact
as a traditional wealth tax.  However, the total wealth for each group of
households must be adjusted because the retrospective tax will not be
applied to income that is passed through from businesses such as proprie-
torships, partnerships, and S corporations.  Table 3 shows the total
wealth for each segment of the wealth distribution after making this ad-
justment,240 as well as the proposed tax rates and the estimated amount
of tax that would have been collected in 2012 using those rates.
238 Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, app. at tbls.A0, B1, B2 & B3.
239 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 176. R
240 Capital gains on such business assets will be captured by the retrospective tax.  For
estimating the retrospective tax base, I assume that 75% of the value of sole proprietorships,
partnerships, and S corporations is represented by ongoing cash flows and 25% by capital
gains; only the latter is included in the tax base in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
RETROSPECTIVE TAX BASE AND REVENUES,
ESTIMATED FOR 2012
Wealth
Avg. Real Captured by
Growth Retrospective Proposed Estimated Average
Rate, Tax Marginal Revenue Effective
Household Groups 1980–2012 (Trillions) Tax Rate (Billions) Tax Rate
Bottom 90% 0.9% $11.2 — — —
Top 10–5% 1.2% $6.4 — — —
Top 5–1% 1.6% $11.3 1% $39 0.3%
Top 1%–0.5% 2.3% $3.5 2% $29 0.8%
Top 0.5%–0.1% 3.0% $6.0 2% $87 1.5%
Top 0.1%–0.01% 4.3% $5.3 4% $145 2.7%
Top 0.01% 6.9% $5.8 4% $223 3.9%
All 2.1% $49.5 $523 1.1%
Note: Dollar figures are in current 2012 dollars.  Estimates assume that the distribution
of shares in S corporations is the same as for sole proprietorships and partnerships.241
As shown in Table 3, the bottom 95% of households pay no retro-
spective capital tax at all, while the 1% tax rate begins at the minimum
amount of wealth to be in the top 5%—about $1.2 million in 2012 (see
Table 2).  The tax rate is 1% until the minimum threshold for the top 1%
($4 million), then 2% until the minimum threshold for the top 0.1%
($20.6 million), and 4% thereafter.  At these rates, the retrospective tax
would have collected an estimated $523 billion in 2012—essentially the
same as the $517 billion that it needs to replace.  The final column of
Table 3 shows the average effective tax rate for each group of house-
holds—total taxes divided by total wealth subject to the tax.242  Compar-
ing this column to the first column, which shows the average growth rate
of household wealth for each group, we see that the retrospective tax has
no impact on the families whose wealth has grown most slowly, while it
has the largest impact on those who have gained the most—which is
exactly the point.243
241 Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, app. at tbls.A0, A1, B1, B2, B3 & B10. R
242 The average effective rate is lower than the marginal rate because, for example, house-
holds pay no tax on their first $1.2 million in wealth.
243 The first column is the average after-tax growth rate of household wealth, so the pre-
tax rate is higher.  In order for the retrospective capital tax to do a better job than the current
tax system at reducing the inequality in wealth growth rates, it must be more progressive than
the taxes that it replaces.  In fact, the retrospective capital tax is likely to be significantly more
progressive.  Comparing estimated pre-tax and after-tax rates of return by wealth group in
2012, the bottom 90% paid an average of 1.4% of their wealth in taxes on capital (compared to
0% under the proposal), while the top 0.01% paid an average of 2.8% (compared to 3.9%
under the proposal).  Saez & Zucman, supra note 5, app. at tbls.B30 & B31. R
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These are only rough estimates, of course.  We do not know how
actual collections under the retrospective tax will compare to ex ante
estimates based on the stock of household wealth.244  I have also not
attempted to model taxpayer responses to the retrospective tax, such as
attempts by lower-bracket business owners to change their pass-through
entities into corporations.  Switching to a retrospective capital tax would
introduce transition issues; even though tax collections should average
3.2% of GDP over the long term, they could be lower upon implementa-
tion.  For example, investors may choose to sell assets with short holding
periods, for which the tax liability will be considerably lower than under
the current income tax.245  Furthermore, there are many administrative
details that would have to be worked out, but there is no particular reason
to believe that they would be more complicated than the rules currently
in place for investment income.  This illustration demonstrates that it is
possible to construct a schedule of retrospective tax rates that exempts
95% of the population from any tax on capital income, significantly
reduces the growth of the largest fortunes, and raises enough revenue to
replace most existing taxes on capital.
E. Summary
A retrospective capital tax, assessed as a tax on imputed wealth, can
be an effective tool for reducing the rate of return on capital for the rich-
est families and preventing the development of a society dominated by
inherited wealth.  Although it lacks the simplicity of an annual wealth
tax, it has some major advantages: the retrospective capital tax does not
require a catalog of all wealth or annual valuations of all assets, and it
does not violate the U.S. Constitution.  In the United States, it could be
designed to exempt 95% of all households and impose a minimal burden
(an average effective rate of 0.3%) on another 4%, while still raising
enough money to replace the corporate income tax, the estate tax, and
most individual income taxes on capital.  Because the retrospective tax
maintains the current level of taxes on capital, it does not change the
incentive to save or the incentive to emigrate in the aggregate.  Most
importantly, by reducing rates of return for the very wealthiest house-
244 If anything, we should expect actual collections to be higher than estimated because
assuming that assets appreciate at the risk-free rate will, on average, produce imputed asset
values that are higher than their actual historical values.
245 For example, if an investor buys an asset for $100 and sells it a year and a day later for
$200, the current income tax liability is about $25 (assuming the maximum rate for long-term
capital gains).  Under the retrospective capital tax, even at a 4% rate, the tax liability would be
$4.  (Conversely, assets with a long holding period and lower gains will be taxed much more
heavily under the retrospective tax.)  Of course, the United States government is amply able to
smooth out fluctuations in tax revenue by borrowing.
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holds, it can slow or reverse the concentration of wealth in the hands of a
small number of families.
VI. COULD IT HAPPEN?
A last objection to a new tax on capital is that it is politically im-
plausible, especially in the contemporary United States, where anti-tax
sentiment has been especially strong for the past four decades.246  There
are several reasons to believe, however, that a retrospective capital tax
might be able to gain the political support necessary for passage.
People often underestimate the speed with which particular propos-
als can move from the fringes of political debate to the center.  The most
striking example in recent American politics is marriage equality.  In
2004, same-sex marriage first became legal in the United States in Mas-
sachusetts.  By the end of 2006, more than half of all states had passed
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage; and yet, by the
end of 2014, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia permitted
same-sex marriages.247
Returning closer to our subject, the conventional wisdom is that it is
overwhelmingly difficult to raise taxes in the United States today.  Yet
we have seen two major tax increases (and one smaller but significant
one) in just over two decades.  In 1993, President Bill Clinton’s first
budget act raised income taxes, primarily on the rich, with the top rate
climbing to 39.6%.248  In 2013, Congress and President Barack Obama
agreed to increase the estate tax and to raise income taxes: the top rate on
ordinary income increased from 35% to 39.6% (not counting payroll
taxes) and the top rate on dividends and long-term capital gains increased
from 15% to 20%.249  In addition, in 2010, the health care reform bills
increased total Medicare payroll taxes from 2.9% to 3.8% for high earn-
ers and imposed a new 3.8% Medicare tax on investment income for
246 See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, WHITE HOUSE BURNING: THE FOUNDING FA-
THERS, OUR NATIONAL DEBT, AND WHY IT MATTERS TO YOU 68–103 (2012).
247 A Timeline of Same-Sex Marriage in the U.S., BOSTON GLOBE (May 20, 2014), http://
www.bostonglobe.com/2014/05/20/same-sex-marriage-over-time/mbVFMQPyxZCpM2eSQ
MUsZK/story.html.
248 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
249 See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313
(2013).  Technically speaking, this might be considered a tax decrease, since the 2012 rates
expired at midnight on December 31, 2012, when higher, Clinton-era rates went into effect;
the new Act was passed on January 1, 2013 and signed the next day.  Politically, however,
both sides positioned the bill as a tax increase: Republicans in order to oppose it (in late 2012),
President Obama to show that he was increasing taxes on the rich.
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high-income households.250  These examples show that it is feasible to
raise taxes, particularly on the rich.
Since the purpose of a retrospective capital tax is to reduce the rate
of return on capital, it does not have to increase revenues.  Instead, as
proposed above, the retrospective tax could replace the corporate income
tax, the estate tax, and most individual income taxes on capital, making it
considerably more palatable to the public and to Congress.  A new tax to
reduce existing taxes is a very different proposition from a new tax to
pay for government in the abstract or to reduce the national debt, which
remains a poorly understood abstraction.  In an alternative design, a ret-
rospective capital tax could be used to reduce taxes on labor income,
which would shift the tax burden from people who are actively working
(“entrepreneurs”) to people with accumulated assets (“heirs”).
A retrospective capital tax on large fortunes with an exemption
amount of $1.2 million, as proposed above, would provoke the usual
objections about “punishing success” and “class warfare.”  In fact, it
would maintain the existing tax burden and shift it considerably upwards
in the wealth distribution.  At the end of the day, two factors figure into
any voter’s evaluation of a tax.  One is how much the voter rationally
expects to pay.  On this score, a vast majority of Americans should be in
favor of a retrospective capital tax with a large exemption, as outlined in
Part V.D.  In 2010, the median net worth of American households was
only $77,300.251  Social mobility in the United States is low compared to
most other developed countries.252  A person born in the middle wealth
quintile only has a 9% chance of making it into the top wealth quin-
tile.253  The chances are obviously lower for an adult who is in the mid-
dle quintile.  In other words, the likelihood that the median voter will
ever be subject to the retrospective capital tax is small, as is the expected
amount of tax the voter would have to pay even then (since families
between the 95th and 99th percentiles pay an effective tax rate of only
0.3%).254
250 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010).
251 See Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evi-
dence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1, 1, 17 (2012).
252 See Mobility, Measured, ECONOMIST (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
united-states/21595437-america-no-less-socially-mobile-it-was-generation-ago-mobility-
measured.
253 See Emily Beller & Michael Hout, Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United
States in Comparative Perspective, 16 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 19, 27 (2006).
254 In addition, having enough wealth to be subject to the tax is an unlikely good out-
come; on an ex ante basis, people should be willing to pay some taxes in that scenario in
exchange for lower taxes in the more likely scenario that they will never have enough wealth
to qualify.
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The second factor is ideology.  People do not always vote their eco-
nomic interests, which makes the prospects for a retrospective capital tax
seem less certain.  The estate tax, for example, affects only a tiny fraction
of people, yet is consistently unpopular in polls.255  Undoubtedly, many
people do not realize just how rich you have to be to pay the estate tax,
or overestimate their chances of ever amassing such wealth.  But it is
also possible that many people simply believe that the estate tax is wrong
in principle.  Perhaps we have been conditioned to feel that it is legiti-
mate to tax income but not to tax accumulated wealth.
Yet attitudes may be shifting.  The financial crisis, the Occupy Wall
Street Movement, and recent elections have considerably increased the
prominence of economic inequality in public debate.  Americans today
have become less optimistic about their prospects for social mobility,256
and therefore may be more open to taxes on large fortunes.  In 2012,
President Obama’s proposal for a minimum 30% effective tax rate on
households making more than $1 million per year received large majority
support from the public and even garnered the support of fifty-one sena-
tors257 before ultimately being defeated.  The votes may not yet be there,
but public sentiment appears to be moving in the right direction for
higher taxes on capital.258
One final challenge to the proposed retrospective capital tax is its
apparent complexity: people may find it difficult to understand a tax that
is levied on past asset values estimated using the risk-free rate of return.
The tax code is already extremely complex, often in ways that are diffi-
cult to understand without some understanding of tax theory.  The taxa-
tion of original issue discount bonds, the limit on the deductibility of
capital losses, and the preferred tax rate for qualified dividends are all
policy choices that would be difficult to justify to the public in an open
debate.
If using the risk-free rate to impute historical asset values proves too
theoretical or academic for Congress to digest, an alternative could as-
sume that assets appreciated at a constant annual rate, as described in
Part V.A.  For example, if a taxpayer buys an asset for $100 and sells it
for $121 two years later, the tax system could assume that its value in-
creased at a constant rate of 10% per year, so it was worth $110 in the
intervening year.  This approach is inferior to using the risk-free rate of
255 See Kevin Drum, What’s the Deal with the Estate Tax?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 15,
2010), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/12/whats-deal-estate-tax.
256 See Mobility, Measured, supra note 252. R
257 See Frank Newport, Americans Favor “Buffett Rule” by 60% to 37%, GALLUP (Apr.
3, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153887/americans-favor-buffett-rule.aspx.
258 See Richard Lavoie, Dreaming the Impossible Dream: Is a Wealth Tax Now Possible
in America? 27–29 (Univ. of Akron Sch. of Law Legal Studies Res. Paper Series, Paper No.
14-01, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402978.
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return because it permits taxpayers to lower their effective tax rates by
making strategic choices of which assets to sell, but this is already a
problem with the existing system of taxing capital gains.259
Like any major tax reform, the retrospective capital tax faces daunt-
ing political challenges.  However, it could also draw political support
because it simplifies the tax system and maintains the same overall level
of revenues while shifting the tax burden upward toward the wealthiest
families.  The retrospective capital tax is not a political impossibility and
merits consideration as a viable tool to slow the growth of inequality.
CONCLUSION
It is possible to disagree with Thomas Piketty’s analysis, according
to which the rate of return on investments will normally exceed the over-
all growth rate of the economy, enabling the very rich to blast off into a
higher economic orbit and entrenching extreme levels of inequality in
developed societies.  But if we take seriously the problem of high and
growing inequality, then taxes on capital are the logical response—and
the retrospective capital tax proposed here can effectively slow down the
accumulation of wealth while avoiding the most significant problems
with an annual wealth tax or a traditional income tax.
259 See Auerbach, supra note 180, at 168. R
